a ticket in the field. Esténos also said that when he and the other leaders of the party were arrested in April and May, 1910, on the charge of "inciting rebellion" the Government made known to them that the arrest and incarceration for several months had been in obedience to "indications from Washington."

The above information is communicated to the Department as of possible interest in the maintenance of the Morita law, which forbids the organization of negroes into a political party.

President Gómez, according to a statement issued at the Palace, informed the committee that he was disposed to aid them provided they dropped the word "Colored" from their party name. They replied that they were not prepared to accept the condition as it would prevent them from realizing "the noble ideals at which they aimed." The President thereupon informed the committee that not only would he not aid them in obtaining the repeal of the Morita law but would put every possible obstacle in their way. The spokesman of the committee replied that notwithstanding the opposition of the President "they would allow nothing to stand in the way of carrying out their intentions."

Evaristo Esténos yesterday made a statement to the press in which he declared that the Colored party was all-powerful and that no political party could hope to win at the polls without its help. He also stated that a committee of his organization "authorized by Minister Beaupré" would soon go to Washington to explain the situation to the American Government. I need hardly state that I have had no communication with Esténos and know nothing of his plans further than already reported in my No. 71 of the 26th ultimo.

I have [etc.]

A. M. Beaupré.
2. Whichever of the alternatives stated in 2 is decided upon, a term shall be set for terminating hostilities with the settlement of the case in hand, which term will expire February 24, 1912.

3. At the expiration of this term the suspension of the civil service law shall cease by virtue of a conduction of Congress upon request of the President.

4. The leaders of the Cuban revolution this day ascertained in the Palace and the members of the local organization of the Veterans of the Independence pledge themselves to be the guardians of the moral and material peace by assisting the national Government in maintaining it.

5. The Government of the Republic shall publish this agreement so that all may know that those who sacrificed themselves to independence are the most stable support of the Republic, and that law and order and the stability of our institutions are henceforth guaranteed and peace assured; wherefore there will be no justification for any intervention in our internal affairs by the United States, to whose honor and loyalty as well as to its own patrimony the Cuban people trusts its peaceful development.

It will be noticed that the agreement, in providing for the repeal of the suspension of the civil service law, goes further than was demanded by the Department's note. The Sub-Secretary of State assures me that complete accord prevailed at the conference and that the terms of the agreement would undoubtedly be complied with.

BEAUPRÉ.

NEGRO UPRISING—ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES—PROTECTION OF FOREIGN COLONIES.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State,

FEBRUARY 19, 1912.

SIR: I have the honor to invite the Department's attention to Mr. Jackson's despatch No. 973 of March 10, 1 the Department's instruction No. 963 of March 20, 1911, and prior correspondence relative to the "Independent Party of Color" (Partido Independiente de Color) of Cuba. It was announced at that time that the party intended to send a delegation to Washington for a presentation of grievances.

The leader of that party, Evaristo Estenoz, called at the Legation two days ago and stated that the party had decided to send to Washington as soon as the present cold weather in the north should set up a little a delegation of six, one from each province. He said that the principal grievances which among others it is intended to bring before the President of the United States is that, preceding the elections held in the fall of 1908 under the Provisional Government, their party was duly recognized and given standing as a political party by Governor Magoon in a formal decree; that, in contravention of the proclamation which made all acts of the Provisional Government binding upon the Republic of Cuba, the Gomez administration through the bipartisan electoral boards has refused to recognize the standing which had been accorded them by the Provisional Government; and that in the approaching electoral period they have reason to believe that they will be similarly debarred from placing

1 Not printed.

CUBA.

February 27, 1912.

SIR: In view of the recent successful intimidation of the Government by the Veterans the Estenozistas apparently considered the present a most opportune moment to redouble their efforts. The Government realizes this and, having the Veteranista experience fresh in mind, is said to be prepared to take strong measures to put down the agitation without temporizing should it show signs of gaining headway.

As the Department already knows, Estenoz is a troublesome negro agitator and, though he has a comparatively small following, might,
FOREIGN RELATIONS.

in the present unsettled political situation, be capable of precipitating
trouble of a serious nature.

I have [etc.]

A. M. BEAUPRÉ.

File No. 837.00/578.

[Extract.]

MARCH 23, 1912.

No. 178.

Sir: Referring to previous correspondence concerning the "Inde-
pendent Colored Party" I have the honor to transmit herewith a
COPY and translation of a telegram received by me this morning from
one of the members of that party, complaining of the action of the
Cuban authorities in breaking up a meeting at Cruces in Santa Clara
Province.

This continual agitation of the "Independientes de Color" car-
ries with it an element of considerable danger to public order, for
while only a small proportion of the negro population is affected by
the Estenzo movement his followers are sufficiently numerous to
form the nucleus of a revolt that in any case, even were the Govern-
ment able to cope with it, would be extremely harmful, and if ably
led and financed by other discontented elements might result in a re-
petition of the events of 1899.

I have [etc.]

A. M. BEAUPRÉ.

[Inclosure.—Translation.]

Mr. BEAUPRÉ, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Republic
of Cuba, Havana: I beg to request the immediate acceptance of our most solemn
protest against the action of the Government of Cuba in the matter of your
Telegraphic—Excerpts.—Paraphrase.

The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

File No. 837.00/592.

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Havana, May 4, 1912.

Strike of Habana stevedores last night. General strike threatened
unless military orders 71 and 76 are enforced. Present strike seri-
ously damages horticultural interests, almost entirely American, and
important American shipping interests. For political reasons the
Government is anxious to conciliate the stevedores, and is urging
shipping interests to accept their demands. In the event of violence
I fear the Government will not afford adequate protection without
strong representations from the legation.

BEAUPRÉ.

File No. 837.00/668.

CUBA.

MAY 20, 1912.

Last night a number of negroes were arrested in the Provinces of
Santiago, Santa Clara, and Pinar del Río for alleged revolutionary
plot to seize all rural guard posts in those Provinces at an unannounced
time. Considerable number of suspects, including Estenzo, have
disappeared. Government confident that movement is completely
suppressed.

BEAUPRÉ.

File No. 837.00/681.

MAY 21, 1912.

Small parties of negroes in conflict with rural guard at various
points. Several casualties in guard. Armed negro bands near Ha-
vana and in Oriente and Santa Clara Provinces and possibly else-
where. Leaders threaten to destroy foreign property. Consuls at
Santiago and Sagua la Grande report considerable alarm there.
Government yesterday sent 500 troops to Oriente Province; 500 more
this morning. Government somewhat alarmed. President evidently
decides to deal severely with leaders and expresses confidence in his
ability to crush movement with forces at his command.

BEAUPRÉ.

File No. 837.00/682.

MAY 23, 1912.

President fears he will not be able to station on all foreign proper-
ties sufficient forces to guarantee absolute protection, that he will
go as far as possible. Over 2,000 troops in the field in Oriente Pro-
vinces with strict orders to deal severely with the rebels. Further
troops are being rushed to the front. The President hopes he will be
able to crush movement entirely within ten days. Negroes are avoid-
ing encounters, their first object being the destruction of property.
A British cruiser will arrive here to-morrow on a visit announced by
the British Minister several weeks ago. Government has made no
public announcement of the visit and arrival of cruiser may cause
some excitement.

BEAUPRÉ.

File No. 837.00/692.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 23, 1912.

You will explain to the Cuban Government that the following had-
to-day been given to the press in the hope of defusing the situa-
tion and thereby assisting the Government of Cuba to put down
the present uprising:

Information reaching the Department of State has indicated a serious state of
disturbance in the westernmost Province of the Island of Cuba, especially in
the neighborhood of Guanahumo and Santiago, where there are important
American interests, which have already made representations to the Department to the effect that their property is being stored and the lives of their employees endangered, and have requested that the Government of the United States procure for them adequate protection. The Department of State has accordingly requested the Navy Department to send vessels and marines to the United States naval station at Guantanamo, which is near the center of the disturbances. The Prairie is to take 500 marines and join the Providence and Nashville there. These steps have, of course, been taken simply in order that, in case of necessity, protection may be accorded to the Americans in that vicinity.

Should situation require, additional vessels will also be ordered to Guantanamo.

Knox.

—the American Minister to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram—Paraguay]

American Legation, Havana, May 84, 1918.

No possibility of agreement in stevedore strike; fifteen-day truce ends to-morrow at midnight. Stevedores and lightermen announce that they will then go on strike, with strong possibility of general strike in Havana and other cities. In present crisis, stoppage of foodstuffs and customs receipts would have serious effect. Suggest advisability of sending ships with marines to Key West, whence they could be quickly summoned in event of trouble.

Braunfle.

[Extract]

American Legation, Havana, May 84, 1918.

Sir: Referring to previous correspondence in regard to the present negro uprising, and as a matter of record, I have the honor to report as follows:

**

From the beginning of the movement I have been in close touch with the representatives of American companies in the disaffected districts and have, whenever there was any cause for alarm, applied to the Cuban Government for military protection. On the 88th instant, on learning of the fears of various American companies in Oriente Province, I desired it advisable to call upon Mr. Sanguily [Secretary of State] to discuss the entire situation in an informal and friendly way. While applying for protection for the Juragua Iron Co. I told Mr. Sanguily that my representations on behalf of this and other American companies included in the disaffected districts should not be considered in the nature of complaints; that I felt and was confident that he also realized that the interests of the American and Cuban Governments were identical in the present crisis; and that the American Government was just as anxious as that of Cuba to avoid the necessity for an intervention. I went on to point out that, in case of failure to afford adequate protection to foreign lives and property, which must readily cause pressure to be brought upon the American Government by other foreign Governments to bring about an intervention for the benefit of their national interests, I went on to say that, although there had as yet been apparently no failure on the part of the Cuban Government to discharge its obligations in this regard, I deemed it the part of true friendship to point out this possible danger to the maintenance of Cuban independence and urged him to exercise every effort to avoid complications.

Mr. Sanguily expressed himself as thoroughly understanding and sincerely appreciating the force and spirit of my remarks, with which he said that he fully agreed. He informed me that he would go immediately to the Palace and make clear to the President the vital necessity for exercising every possible effort to protect foreign property, urging him personally to issue instructions in harmony with the ideas expressed by me. While I had no instructions from the Department authorizing me to make such representations, I felt confident that I was stating elementary truths which were in complete harmony with the desires of the Department.

As a result of Mr. Sanguily’s interview with the President a body of 180 troops was dispatched to the various properties of the Juragua Iron Co., and the officer in command in Oriente Province was directed to despatch small forces to the various foreign properties throughout the district and at the same time to arm their employees so that they might defend themselves if attacked. I am informed that these instructions were promptly obeyed.

The sending of the Prairie, Paduak, and Nashville to Guantanamo has made a very good impression here, and both the President and Mr. Sanguily express themselves as gratified by our action in the matter. It is difficult to say, however, what moral effect the presence of these ships will have upon the irresponsible negroes, who are unlikely to be greatly concerned over the possible consequences of their actions. **

Aside from the fact that we have been unable to form an accurate estimate of the strength and extent of this movement, its most remarkable characteristic is that there is no definite knowledge of its real purpose. There are various theories advanced to account for the movement. The most prevalent belief is that the movement was initiated for the express purpose of provoking an American intervention for the benefit of various interests which believed that they would profit by a change of government. A movement aimed at provoking intervention would naturally devote its first efforts to the destruction of foreign property, but, as I have already reported, very little has been done in this direction. **

In summing up the situation I can not go further than to say that it would seem evident that the present movement is organized and directed by some unknown interest, it being highly improbable that the negroes at the head of the Independent Colored Party would be capable of engineering a movement on this scale. The negroes now in revolt are of a very ignorant class, and, although it may or may not be the intention of their leaders to attack foreigners and destroy their property, it would at any time require only a well-conceived appeal to their prejudices and stupidity to precipitate serious disorders. Although it is still impossible to make any predictions as to the future, I feel that our Government has acted most wisely in sending forces to Guantanamo in anticipation of possible eventualities.

I have [etc.].

A. M. Braunfle.
The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

[Telegram.—Paraphrase.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

The Nebraska should arrive at Habana to-morrow, and a large naval force will be assembled at a convenient point, probably Key West. A gunboat will be ordered to Nipe Bay.

You will inform the Cuban Government that in the event of its inability or failure to protect the lives or property of American citizens in Cuba the Government of the United States, pursuant to its uniform custom in such cases, will land forces to accord necessary protection. This is not intervention.

KNOX.

The President of Cuba to the President.

[Telegram.—Translation.]

HABANA, May 26, 1917.

The Secretary of State of this Government informs me that he has received a note from the Minister of the United States in this city advising him that the Government over which you preside has ordered a gunboat sent to Nipe Bay and the concentration of a naval force at Key West in anticipation of possible eventualities, so that in the event of failure or neglect of the Government to protect the life or property of American citizens the United States will land on Cuban territory for their necessary protection, adding that these measures must not be considered specifically as an intervention; but as in reality they do not seem anything else, and the natural development of events, once these foreign troops landed, would accentuate that character, it is my duty to inform you that a determination of this serious character alarms and injures the feelings of a people loving and jealous of their independence, above all when such measures were not even decided upon by previous agreement between both Governments, which places the Government of Cuba in a humiliating inferiority through a neglect of its national rights. Nor is the action of the American Government justified, because neither it nor any other Government in analogous circumstances would have displayed such extraordinary activity in mobilization and operations. In only four days it has accumulated more than 3,000 men of the regular forces against the rebels, sending them from the west to the east by land and sea, and in this short time it has cleared the whole island, with the exception of a limited eastern territory, of armed parties to such an extent that there does not exist a single one which will resist, neither in Pinar-del-Rio nor in this Province nor in Santa Clara, where, since the 19th instant, some of them appeared, who were punished and disbanded. Furthermore, this Government has awakened public spirit, has distributed for the defense of farms and villages more than 9,000 rifles, with cartridges, and preparations are being made to flood with fighting patriots and with soldiers the relatively narrow zone to which the rebels have been reduced, the fact being really astonishing that up to the present no sugar mill has suspended work. I have recourse to you, therefore, as the loyal friend of Cuba and respectful of her rights, in order that with calm judgment and highmindedness you may appreciate the facts set forth, sure that you will reach the conviction that the Government is quite capable and sufficiently supported by the valor and patriotism of its people to annihilate a few rebels without a cause and without a flag. If you properly appreciate these facts you will without doubt hasten to recognize that it is not a friendly Government which, perchance by way of an unjustified precaution, would precipitately contribute to the discredit of a Government and a people like those of Cuba, placed, it is true, in circumstances difficult although not superior to the measure of its patriotism and its spirit.

JOSE MIGUEL GOMEZ.

The President to the President of Cuba.

[Telegram.]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, May 27, 1917.

I am sincerely gratified to learn of your Government’s energetic measures to put down the disturbances and to know that you are confident of being successful. As was fully explained to the Cuban Chargé d’Affaires here, this Government’s motive in sending ships to Key West, just as in sending the Prairie to the Guantánamo naval station, was merely to be able to act promptly in case it should unfortunately become necessary to protect American life and property by rendering moral support or assistance to the Cuban Government. As was made clear at that time, these ordinary measures of precaution were entirely dissociated from any question of intervention.

W. H. Taft.

The President of Cuba to the President.

[Telegram.]

HABANA, May 27, 1917.

Exceedingly grateful for your cablegram, which, in appealing Cuban patriotism with the assurance that the action of the Government under your worthy Presidency is limited to observe events in order to be ready, should it be necessary to protect the lives and property of American citizens and morally to support the Cuban Government without having to land American forces in our territory unless both Governments agree upon such extreme necessity, clearly shows the sincerity of the Government and of the people of the United States, and their noble and friendly sentiments in favor of the Government and people of Cuba, who are determined to re-establish public peace as soon as possible, for which purpose they will not hesitate at any sacrifice.

JOSE M. GOMEZ.
The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

[File No. 837.11/46]

Department of State, Washington, May 28, 1918.

Americans at Victoria de Las Tunas, Oriente, Cuba, have applied to the Department for protection. Make suitable representations to Foreign Office. On receipt by you of similar requests take like action and reserve rights of reclamation for any damages suffered by Americans.

Knox.

[File No. 837.00/624]

[Telegram—Extract—Paraphrase]

The following rejoinder from President Gómez to the President:

[Telegram of President Gómez of May 27.]

This Government has taken pains to make absolutely clear its position and the absolutely evident distinction, on the one hand, between "intervention" and political acts under our treaty rights which are not now contemplated, and, on the other hand, preparations to land marines and the landing of marines if necessary in sporadic cases to prevent or suppress disorders to American life or property. Part of President Gómez’s last message evidently seeks to read a singular misinterpretation into this Government’s clear expressions. This Government does not undertake first to consult the Cuban Government if a crisis arises requiring a temporary landing somewhere to protect life and property on the broad principles of international practice. You will clearly explain this orally to President Gómez.

Knox.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram—Extract—Paraphrase]

American Legation, Havana, May 29, 1918—7 p.m.

The president of Guantánamo & Western Railway, Mr. Lewis, who arrived this morning from Oriente, informs me that when the store of his sugar estate at Marcos Sánchez was robbed two days ago, leader of band, who could not read or write, gave what he evidently thought was a receipt for the goods taken, but it was really an original order from Estévez to his lieutenants, and in translation reads about as follows:

To the lieutenant [who receives this and to all my other loyal lieutenants):

If by June 1 the Morada law is not repealed you will at once start to destroy all railroad bridges, telegraph and telephone lines, and other property of American ownership, and if this does not accomplish our purpose with the present

[File No. 837.00/643]

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

May 29, 1918—9 p.m.

In pursuance of your May 29, I saw the President, who declared that he recognized our rights under the circumstances named. He added emphatic appreciation of our Government’s “fine attitude” throughout present crisis, which he says has been worth more to him than his entire army.

Brautigam.

[File No. 837.00/643]

May 30, 1918.

Mr. Gibson delivered my note regarding protection of Spanish-American Iron Co., and under my general instructions to make strong supporting representations, he had a very frank but friendly talk with Patterson. I trust this may stimulate the authorities to proper action. Gibson pointed out that failure to fulfill repeated verbal and written assurances of protection was the one thing destructive of our confidence in ability and willingness of Cuban Government to fulfill its obligations; that repeated failure would surely cause our Government seriously to consider the need for its giving protection to American interests; that if this was to be avoided Cuban Government must immediately take energetic steps. Patterson replied that it was local military authorities who were at fault, but Gibson rejoined that admission of inability of Cuban Government to secure obedience of its military officers was very serious, and that our Government looks alone to the Central Government for the protection of American interests. Patterson cordially promised to use best efforts to bring military authorities to proper realization of responsibilities.

Brautigam.

The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

Department of State, Washington, June 1, 1918—8 p.m.

The following telegraphic instructions to consular officers in Cuba were sent to-day:

If disturbances arise in any locality threatening the lives or property of American citizens you will promptly communicate with the Legation, which has

[Subsecretary of State]
Government, within 15 days thereafter you will start killing men not of our color irrespective of nationality.

Lewis has original document in his safe. If it is authentic and not a spurious document deliberately allowed to fall into foreign hands for the purpose of inspiring alarm, it would appear to be the most significant indication we have had as to intentions of leaders and reasons for lack of violence to date. Lewis also showed me letter from Estenoz to him demanding 25 rifles and 5,000 rounds of ammunition, under penalty of destruction of his property.

In pursuance of your May 29, I saw the President, who declared that he recognized our rights under the circumstances named. He added emphatic appreciation of our Government's "fine attitude" throughout present crisis, which he says has been worth more to him than his entire army.

Mr. Gibson delivered my note regarding protection of Spanish-American Iron Co., and under my general instructions to make strong supporting representations, he had a very frank but friendly talk with Patterson. I trust this may stimulate the authorities to proper action. Gibson pointed out that failure to fulfill repeated verbal and written assurances of protection was the one thing destructive of our confidence in ability and willingness of Cuban Government to fulfill its obligations; that repeated failure would surely cause our Government seriously to consider the need for its giving protection to American interests; that if this was to be avoided Cuban Government must immediately take energetic steps. Patterson replied that he was local military authorities who were at fault, but Gibson rejoined that admission of inability of Cuban Government to secure obedience of its military officers was very serious, and that our Government looks alone to the Central Government for the protection of American interests. Patterson cordially promised to use best efforts to bring military authorities to proper realization of responsibilities.

The following telegraphic instructions to consular officers in Cuba were sent to-day:

If disturbances arise in any locality threatening the lives or property of American citizens you will promptly communicate with the Legation, which has
been instructed to make suitable representations to the Cuban Government for protection. You will endeavor to keep informed of political conditions throughout your district.

On being advised by consular officers or otherwise of any serious situation threatening the lives or property of American citizens, you will bring the matter to the attention of the Cuban Government with the request that suitable steps be taken to afford adequate protection.

You will instruct consular officers to keep Legation and Department informed by telegraph on Monday and Thursday of each week of movement of Cuban and revolutionary forces in their districts.

You will at once endeavor to have the Cuban Government station and maintain regular guards of 300 men each at both Daiquirí and Linares and of 50 men at El Cobre for the protection of the Spanish-American, the Juragua, and Cuba Copper companies. This is most important.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 1, 1912—11 p.m.

Persistent and consistent rumors of concerted negro uprising in Habana for the past several days. Although disclaiming knowledge of plan, President's private secretary is organizing local civil guard for the protection of Habana and Vedado. This afternoon I asked President Gómez whether he had any such plan. He said that he was sure there was nothing of the sort intended; he has ample forces to put down any movement. Military attaché states that there are at most 700 soldiers in the neighborhood. Chief of police has recently complained to member of Legation that he has only a little more than 500 men, not enough to guard city in normal peaceful conditions. The foregoing may be sufficient for the Department to determine whether it is advisable to send to Habana immediately one of the ships now at Key West with a force of marines.

From apparently reliable information it is evident that negroes have bought large quantities of knives and other arms and that many negroes have left the city.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 1, 1912—10 p.m.

Consul at Santiago telegraphs: La Maya, town of 4,000, completely destroyed by insurgents last night by fire. Defended by seven Russians.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 1, 1912

Sir: It may be said with certainty that the Cuban Government is systematically endeavoring to create an unduly optimistic view of the present situation. Whites throughout the Republic continue to grow more apprehensive. For the past four or five days considerable apprehension has existed in and around Habana. The Government itself, although strenuously denying that there was any ground for fear, has taken the most exaggerated precautions to prevent an uprising. The contradiction between the Government's action and its denial of apprehension have created a decided feeling of apprehension in the city, probably much greater than if the Government had frankly made public its reasons for fearing an outbreak.

It may not be amiss at this time to call the Department's attention to my telegram of May 30, 7 p.m., wherein I quoted what purported to be instructions from President to his lieutenants. It will be noted that the active destruction of foreign property began on the night of May 31, about the time indicated in this instruction, whereas the negro leaders would have found it far less difficult to carry out their purposes in this regard during the first days of the rebellion and before the arrival of the Government forces.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 1, 1912

Sir: Sanguily said to-day that Cuban Government thoroughly understood that American Government reserved right to land forces in its judgment; that all possible facilities in the way of supplies, trans-
portation and cooperation will be given our troops; that his Government welcomed the sending of marines to Guantánamo and that the Cuban troops thus relieved from guard duty would be immediately put in the field. He asked me to transmit the President's request to the officers in command of our forces to deliver to that the officers in command of our forces be instructed to deliver to the municipal authority any rebels who surrender or are captured by them. This is for the purpose of combating belief among the negroes that by surrendering to Americans they will become prisoners of war and will be released upon the termination of hostilities. Sangüely said that although the Cuban Government thoroughly understood our attitude and the more intelligent Cubans approved the landing of troops, there is still a considerable element of suspicion among the negroes that we are determined to lead our support to the constituted Government. In conclusion Mr. Sangüely stated that he had no authority from the President to ask for the sending of more troops, he could state that it was the intention of the Cuban Government immediately to employ in active operations any troops relieved by the arrival of our forces.

BÉAUFÉRÉ.

JUNE 5, 1912——10:45 p. m.

President was today authorized to suspend constitutional guaranties in Oriente Province.

BÉAUFÉRÉ.

The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Washington, June 5, 1912.

The Cuban authorities having failed to take effective action for the protection of American life and property the commandant at Guantánamo naval station has been compelled to land four companies of marines. This action has been taken as a measure of protection only. Four large war vessels will forthwith be sent from Key West to Guantánamo. It is hoped these vessels will be adequate to the duty of Cuba. ‘Four large vessels will be sent to Key West to Guantánamo. It is hoped these vessels will be adequate to the duty of Cuba. The President of Cuba that a continued failure on the part of his Government adequately to protect life and property will inevitably compel this Government to intervene in Cuba under and in response to its treaty rights and obligations.

KNOX.

THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Habana, June 6, 1912.

Sir: Referring to previous correspondence in regard to the present negro uprising in Cuba, I have the honor to submit the following observations for such consideration as the Department may deem appropriate.

While the situation is very serious and rapidly tending toward a condition which will render intervention inevitable, it seems to me that there is still an opportunity for the adoption of a policy or plan of action which might result in a better state of affairs.

It has been my understanding that you earnestly desired to avoid another intervention in Cuba, and I have, therefore, labored constantly to that end since I have been here, under the conviction that intervention, occupation, or annexation would be contrary to our traditional policy and to your expressed wishes and, therefore, to be avoided by all reasonable and honorable means.

There is no doubt in my mind that the present uprising in Oriente is extremely serious, far more serious than the Cuban Government appears to realize or, at any rate, than it is prepared to admit. If the present tactics are continued there is every reason to believe that the uprising will not be put down for months, or even years, without material assistance or intervention by the American Government.

The greatest burden now resting on the Cuban Government is the protection of foreign property. In order to afford anything approaching the protection demanded by foreign interests in Cuba it would require force greatly in excess of those now at the disposal of the Cuban Government at a time when that Government should devote to active operations every soldier it can command. With the best will in the world, the Cuban Government can offer only relative protection, but most of the foreign interests in Oriente quite fail to make any distinction between the interest of the Cuban Government in protecting their property in order to avoid the subsequent claims for damage and their own absolute right to demand and obtain complete security in spite of the troubled conditions now existing.

Although the Cuban Government had not requested the landing of marines for the purpose of affording protection to foreign property, the President expressed his gratification on learning of the fact that a force of marines was landed at Guantánamo yesterday, and sent me word that as rapidly as American forces arrived for the protection of foreign property the Cuban troops stationed there would be promptly withdrawn and devoted to active operation against the rebels.

Aside from the fact that assistance of this sort coming from us would tend to hasten the reestablishment of normal conditions in Cuba, it would seem evident that we will be obliged to land further forces in the very near future. My British and Brazilian colleagues have already expressed surprise that forces landed have been devoted
entirely to the protection of American property, and the former stated to me last night that, unless American or Cuban protection was forthcoming for his nationals in the Guantánamo district by this morning, he intended to cable the Foreign Office in London to urge that representations be made in Washington with a view to having forces of American troops assigned to various British properties in the disaffected districts. I fear that this is merely the beginning of a general demand that American protection be afforded to foreign interests in Oriente. If, either through our own determination thus to aid the Cuban Government to suppress the uprising or through compliance with foreign demands for protection, we eventually release the Cuban forces from police duty so that their entire efforts can be devoted to the prosecution of a campaign against the rebels, it may be confidently said that the chances of a successful outcome will be greatly increased.

As the prosecution of an active campaign on any considerable scale will of course require a large financial outlay, it seems highly probable that the Government will soon be obliged to seek a foreign loan. Under the existing conditions it would seem improbable that any responsible banking house would be prepared to make such a loan without substantial guaranties, and would probably demand them from our Government.

It seems to me that the floating of a new loan would offer us an extremely good opportunity to be of real assistance to the Cuban people by putting our own conditions upon the granting of the loan in order to make sure of its honest application. It would seem that this might readily be made to entail some more or less active fiscal control, which would protect the Cuban treasury against the wholesale looting to which it has hitherto been subjected. As is of course well known, Cuba is naturally so rich a country that an honest administration of her finances would in a short time place the Government in a very stable and prosperous position, and would enable an honest administration to accomplish much for the country which would be impossible if it were to take over the machinery of government and the burden of debt and disorder which now exists.

In closing, I desire to impress upon the Department the fact that my observations in this regard are based upon a desire to offer some possibly helpful suggestions toward the attainment of what I understand to be the desire of the Department in carrying out its policies with regard to Cuba.

I have [etc.]

A. M. Beaupré.

[Telegram—Paraphrase]

File No. 837.00.701.

AMERICAN LEGATION, Havana, June 7, 1912. 11:15 A. M.

There was a Cabinet meeting yesterday, evidently to consider representations made by me in pursuance of Department’s June 5. After the meeting Mr. Snegully issued the following statement,

[Handwritten note: Transmitting Department’s instruction of June 5.]

CUBA.

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ostensibly based upon a telegram received from the Cuban minister in Washington:

I believe we Cubans are in a really critical situation, which the Government intends to overcome by extraordinary effort, being confident that the resolution and patriotism of the country will respond without hesitation, so that no one may underwrite the sacrifices of the Cuban people to avoid a foreign intervention in this international [sec] conflict, thus showing in their purpose full unity of action, their capacity for the independent life of the Republic.

The President then issued a manifesto calling for volunteers “to combat the present movement against civilization.” The entire press is cordially supporting the President.

File No. 837.00.707.

JUNE 7, 1912—7 p. m.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ferrara, left today on an unannounced trip to Washington. I am reliably informed he is special representative of President Obregón to ask further aid in protecting property, but more particularly to plead for time to crush rebellion. This information is from private sources.

Beaupré.

File No. 837.00.772.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Minister.

[Inclosure in despatch 202, June 11, 1912.—Translation]

No. 692.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Havana, June 8, 1912.

Mr. Minister: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency’s note No. 397,1 of the 9th instant, enclosing copy of a note of the same date which you addressed to the President, quoting in part a cablegram which your excellency had received from your Government to the effect that the situation had compelled the commandant of the naval station at Guantánamo to land four companies of marines, and that this action had been taken solely as a measure of precaution and not for the purpose of putting down the rebellion. The cablegram in question also announced the sending of four warships from Key West to Guantánamo for a similar purpose should the situation require additional forces, and, in conclusion, expressed the hope that those measures would bring the Cuban Government to a realizing sense of the necessity of promptly and adequately attending to its duties and responsibilities.

Your excellency added that the Government of the United States desired to announce, through the authorized medium of your excellency, that it would, under certain conditions mentioned and in the event of the continuance of those conditions, be unavoidably compelled to intervene.

And although this announcement of a contingency which, as it is apparently desired to convey, may soon arise is predicated upon observations that are more or less debatable, since your excellency’s Government must from the attitude assumed have felt justified, from
its point of view, to make such observations, I shall not of course examine them closely, nor is it incumbent upon me or appropriate to discuss them; for in those times of trial for their country it is not meet for Cubans to place themselves in the light of thwarting the action of the American Government, more especially because they should not allow themselves for a single instant to doubt the good faith or intentions of the American Government concerning the stability of this Republic.

But permit me, Mr. Minister, in discharge of my conscience and in behalf of the Cuban Government, to be so honestly frank with you as to say that the intervention which has been initiated and is being prepared is in no sense justified.

Leaving aside its affairs—matters of the utmost transcendence, that are really and essentially vital—that are at stake, it will not be denied that we have, at least jointly with the right, the duty to judge the acts of others which so profoundly and absolutely concern us, which to such a degree affect our existence and our pride; for it is true beyond doubt that our Government has not failed in its earnest endeavor to combat the racial uprising and adequately to protect the lives and property of American citizens, since it is a notorious fact that no American property had been destroyed nor had the life of any American citizen been endangered prior to the landing of the American marines. In the short space of two weeks the Cuban Government has really performed wonders; indeed, not every government, even among the best, would, in view of the peculiar circumstances and the exceptional nature of the present conflict, have acted with equal diligence and such extraordinary success.

No one better than your excellency can hear witness to my assertions, acquainted as you are with the great difficulties with which the Cuban Government has had to contend, to the extent even of having had to suspend military operations, or modify the most carefully prepared plans, because of the pressure brought by foreign property owners, or their resident managers, who have contributed so greatly to inciting and keeping alive the alarm, especially abroad, with their clamors for protection for their industries, farms, or dwellings, while the natives, without legiti- mation to which to appeal, were left completely unprotected.

Your excellency knows that this is an island as narrow as it is mountainous; that the population is relatively sparse and distributed over vast solitudes, despite the great progress of all kinds lately made; and that with the whites exist an enormous mass of peoples of African extraction, many of them awakened to the highest ambitions and most unattainable desires (through the fault, be it said, of the governments which have ruled the country during the past quarter century, without exculpating any of them, though the sins of all areas from the noblest and most generous impulses) which has in the end broken out in an explosion of barbarism. So, too, has your excellency been able to see through the intentions of the interventionists as proclaimed by their leaders and published in the press, for the perverse authors of the uprising, alleging fantastic grievances, admit that they have the astounding intention of burning foreign property in order to force upon the United States the necessity for intervention in the absurd and grotesque hope that, as on a former occasion in dealing with the whites, the United States would enter into arrangements with them after first turning out the Government that opposed them.

Yet in but fifteen days this Government, despite so many setbacks, swept the western provinces clear of the stupid rebellion and has reduced it to the isolated zone of Oriente Province, where, ceaselessly and tirelessly, it pursues the villainous bands into the very heart of the rough mountains in which they have taken refuge in order safely to plot the destruction of the property of whites or diabolical assaults upon the honor of white women.

In such circumstances the Cuban Government is of the belief that more could not be expected of it, and that more could not have been done by any government under the same conditions; and therefore so quickly and unjustly to declare the Government a "failure" in this sense is not only to commit a great injustice but to discredit it without purpose and without even advantage to anyone. Now that so many negroes have learnt a lesson, or have repeated, it is not to be assumed that the uprising so resolutely prosecuted will extend to or break out in the western provinces, and, too, the assurance can be vouchsafed that in the affected zone, where the indefatigable and vigorous prosecution of our troops and of our enthusiastic volunteers have the movement cornered and almost in its last gasps, it will soon—as soon as is humanly possible, but, in any event, in a very short time—be broken up and overcome, without outside assistance and solely by the efforts of the Government and the patriotic and valorous cooperation of our people, because, in fine, the conscience and will of the nation have so resolved. For these legitimate reasons, I can really see no objection (but, in fact, positive advantage) to the United States Government—placing itself in our position and considering the efforts we have put forth, the sufficient means at our disposal, and the unanimity with which the country has responded to our call to crush, in one definite and supreme attack, the criminal uprising which is already beginning to show signs of death—defer its preparations (if, indeed, it be true that such preparations are being made) for such time as may reasonably be considered necessary for us to put the finishing touches to its work—the time that the American Government itself would need were it in our place—thus preventing the discredit of a friendly Government such as ours, in regard to which there are those who are already look forward with inden- tuous acceptance to its acknowledgment by the Government which, on the contrary, should encourage and reinforce it with its sympathy and consideration.

Nevertheless, however the procedure of your excellency's Government may be represented, and although the news of an impending intervention of a nature and extent at present unknown has created wide consternation, for my own part, as also for the part of my Government, Mr. Minister, after the protestations from Washington and the assurances which your excellency yourself has been good enough to give me in several interviews, we are of the number who in the present case attribute to the American Government the purpose of preparing an intervention in our internal affairs of a different character, more honorable to the people and Government of the United States, and at the same time more decorous and consoling for Cubans
and the civilization which they represent, many of whom have memories of past interventions.

The restraint of the intentions and the unswerving purpose of the United States to support and maintain through the vicissitudes of our national development the independence of the Island of Cuba having always in the end been plainly manifested, any possibility is conceivable to me in human affairs save that the friendly relations between the American Government and people and the Cuban Government and people (whose mutual affection and concord no circumstance should, for the honor of the United States and the happiness of this people, ever diminish and much less destroy) should not continue, if possible, more solid, more intimately sincere and cordial.

I avail myself, etc. 

MANUEL SANGUINITY.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

(Telegram—Paraphrase.)

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 9, 1912.

Disorders in Habana and suburbs have for some days been assuming character of race war. In spite of threats to deal severely with trouble-makers, the authorities are showing weakness. Americans, other foreigners, and many Cubans extremely apprehensive and appeal for sending of a war vessel. The size of our colony and large number of American women it contains places heavy responsibility upon our Government as regards possible consequences of racial trouble. I feel that a war vessel should be sent immediately for moral effect and to calm general apprehension.

BRAUPHY.

The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

(Telegram—Paraphrase.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 9, 1912.

Two war vessels will be ordered to Habana immediately.

KNOX.

JUNE 10, 1912.

With a letter from President Gómez accrediting him with a confidential mission, Mr. Ferrara called this morning and indicated that the reports to this Government as to the situation in Cuba had been very much exaggerated and that it was particularly important that the Cuban Government itself should put down the insurrection in order to discourage future insurrections based on a hope of provoking American intervention. No disapproval of protection of American interests by the marines now landed or such as might be needed was felt, he said; but it is hoped that they would not be called upon to suppress the insurrection, leaving that to the Cuban forces. He greatly desires that something friendly to the Cuban Government should be expressed by this Government. I told him that the United States hopes and believes the Cuban Government will, by prompt and effective measures, be able to suppress the insurrection, and that the sending of the vessels to Habana last night indicates no change in this Government’s policy of non-intervention. The vessels were sent solely to provide some place and means of safety and protection for Americans and other foreigners and for such moral effect as they might have. The minister, Rivero, urges that the ships be withdrawn from Habana. What are your views concerning this request? Rivero asserts most positively that no one was killed in the troubles in Habana.

KNOX.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

(Telegram—Paraphrase—Paraphrase.)

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 10, 1912.

From the first it has been difficult accurately to estimate the situation because, above all, of complete failure of Government to be fair and frank with me. All statements made upon my own authority have been sent only after the most thorough verification and are entirely accurate. I believe that the consul at Santiago, our chief source of information in Oriente, is thoroughly reliable and conservative. The Government has never been frank, and quite recently it has clearly appeared to me that it considered it necessary to convince the American Government that the insurrection was crushed, in order to avoid intervention. For in spite of protestations of confidence in our intentions, the Cuban Government seems to believe intervention to be imminent. Rivero’s statement as to disorders on Saturday night are quite in line with the policy of his Government in suppressing and distorting news regarding the true situation, which has added materially to the existing feeling of uncertainty and apprehension. As regards withdrawal of ships, I can only say that my telegram of June 9 was sent only after careful consideration. If the sending of the ships was warranted in the first instance I am convinced that there is now no reason for their withdrawal. To-day I gave Admiral Osterhau the substance of my June 9, and such additional information as I had. He said that he thought the vessels should remain for a time for moral effect, even if not upon far more serious duty.

BRAUPHY.

No. 291.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

(Telegram—Paraphrase.)

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 11, 1912.

Sir: Referring to my telegram of June 9, and to subsequent correspondence in regard to the racial disorders in Habana, I have the honor to report as follows.
A little after 9 o'clock Saturday evening a number of negroes were attacked by crowds of whites armed with revolvers. At least one was killed in the center of town and two or three more in various parts of the city and suburbs, the disorders having spread with great rapidity. Large numbers of negroes were beaten and the receiving hospitals were kept busy until a late hour of the night. Although warning had been given the Government of these outbreaks, it had failed to take adequate precaution, and it was some time before sufficient forces were on the ground to clear Central Park and hold the largest crowds in check. On hearing of the trouble Mr. Gibson and Mr. Bull, the two secretaries of this legation, went to Central Park, where they met Colonel Aguierro, chief of police. At his invitation they remained with him in a café on the square, where he established himself to receive reports from his subordinates. He remained there until after 9 o'clock in the morning, receiving frequent verbal reports from his subordinates as to occurrences in various parts of the city, and it was from this source that I gained the information contained in my telegram of June 9.

It was fully expected that serious disorders would occur on Sunday evening. As it happened, however, torrential rains began on Sunday morning and have continued almost constantly. In spite of this the Government had large forces patrolling all the principal streets. It may be said without exaggeration that a large number of the various foreign colonies and a large number of Cubans were in a state of apprehension closely bordering upon panic. The amount of feeling aroused by the disorders of Saturday night and by the reports of outrages received from Oriente had also produced a very dangerous state of mind which entailed, and undoubtedly still entails, great potentialities of trouble. For these reasons and in view of the importance of the American colony in Havana and its suburbs, containing many American women, it seemed to me that a very heavy responsibility rested upon the American Government and upon me in the event of serious racial disorders. Therefore, after much thought and careful consideration of the possible effects of the step, I decided that the only course open to me was to ask for the sending of armed forces to have a decided effect and to calm the general feeling of apprehension. From what I am able to observe, since the arrival of the ships yesterday, the effect has been all that could be desired. A general feeling of relief is evident in the foreign colonies of Havana and apparently a large part of the Cuban population expresses decided satisfaction at our action in sending the ships here. Strange to say, none of the newspapers have expressed pronounced disapproval at the sending of the ships, and those Cubans who are not relieved by their arrival have apparently accepted it apathetically. The only expressions of apprehension or disapproval which I have heard emanate from the Cuban Government itself, which evidently entertains grave fears that the American Government is deliberately seeking pretext for an intervention. In sumning up, I beg to express my thorough conviction that the sending of the ships was fully warranted by the situation, that the effect of their visit has been successful, and that their withdrawal at this time would be a serious mistake.

A. M.-Braun.  

The following from the consul at Santiago:

An order dated June 12, 1912, of which the following is a translation, has been issued and will be promulgated this afternoon:

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The following from the consul at Santiago:
The Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain to the Secretary of State.

Dear Sir: The information received by Government it appears possible that British subjects and their property in the disturbed area in Cuba may be endangered. I have therefore been directed to ask you whether instructions could be sent to the United States Naval authorities now in the island to give protection to British lives and property in cases where the Cuban Government appears unable to provide for it.

It will be within your recollection that your Government was kind enough to issue instructions in 1905 in this sense in the case of the more serious disturbances then existing, and that the Department then informed the Embassy in a telegram dated September 16 that what protection might be available for American life and property would likewise be extended to British subjects.

His Majesty’s Government much appreciate the assistance already given recently to British subjects by the United States troops in Cuba, in at least one instance, and would be grateful for similar assistance in the future, should it become necessary.

I am [etc.]

A. Mitchell Innes.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

Telegram—Paraphrase.

American Legation,
Havana, June 15, 1912.

Wholesale arrests of negroes in Havana and vicinity on charges of conspiracy continue. Although Government continues to maintain that the rest of the country is absolutely quiet, negroes are conspiring almost openly in various parts without interference from the authorities.

A story is being industriously circulated by the Department of the Interior to the effect that the President is planning to send General Wood or General Crowder to Cuba to look into the justices of the negroes’ demands, and that if they so advise the American Government will insist that the negroes be given the upper hand in the Government. This ridiculous story is creating a surprising amount of consternation and resentment even among intelligent classes who would welcome intervention.

Braüer.
FOREIGN RELATIONS.

replies Cuba of its obligation fully to protect foreign life and property, although they have been recognized as greatly strengthening the hand of the Cuban Government. Indeed, the spirit of these measures has been well called a "preventive policy" - a policy of giving Cuba every opportunity to vindicate its national position.

As was officially stated by the Secretary of State on June 19: "The United States is not contemplating intervention in Cuba, but hopes and believes the Cuban Government will, by prompt and active measures, be able to suppress the insurrection."

KNOX.

FILE No. 887.52.

JUNE 14, 1912—5 P. M.

A request has been received for American protection for the Esperanza San Miguel Sugar Mills, owned by the Spanish firm Marion Bosh Co., Santiago. You may bring this and similar cases informally and unofficially to the attention of the Foreign Office, saying that the matter is of course not one primarily for the cognizance of this Government, yet its friendship for and interest in Cuba's ultimate welfare prompt it to bring the case to the attention of the Cuban Government, which it is hoped will take the measures necessary to obviate the possibility of future embarrassment.

KNOX.

FILE No. 887.00/760.

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of President Giron.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 15, 1912.

MY DEAR MR. FERRARA: In reply to your note of the 13th instant, wherein you suggest that to calm the unrest of the people in Cuba an additional statement be made by the American Minister at Havana concerning the real attitude of the Government of the United States, I take pleasure in enclosing copy of a statement which the American minister was authorized to make public yesterday.

I am [etc.]

P. C. KNOX.

FILE No. 887.41.

The Secretary of State to the Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 20, 1912.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 18th instant, in which you state that you have been directed by His Majesty’s Government to ask whether instructions could be sent to the American Naval authorities now in Cuba to give protection to British lives and property in cases where the Cuban Government appears unable to provide protection.

In reply I have the honor to say that I have communicated your note to the Secretary of the Navy with the request that, following the course pursued during the revolutionary disturbances in Cuba in 1898, such protection as may be available for the lives and property of American citizens in Cuba shall likewise be extended to British subjects.

I have, etc.,

P. C. KNOX.

FILE No. 887.00/984.

The American Consul at Santiago to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram—Paraphrase.]

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Santiago, Cuba, June 23, 1912—6 a.m.

The rebel leader Estaniz was killed yesterday in a battle at Mica. His body was brought here and positively identified.

HOLAY.

FILE No. 887.00/482.

The Secretary of State to the American Minister.

[Telegram—Paraphrase.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 28, 1912.

Admiral Osterhaus telegraphs the Navy Department as follows:

The Minister concurs with me in believing that there is no need for ships here and that the Third Division, Atlantic Fleet, with force on board, may return north; also, in my opinion, state of affairs in the Province of Oriente is such that all vessels of the Fourth Division, Atlantic Fleet, may be withdrawn, leaving only town and gunboats to handle situation. The latest reliable information indicates Cuban forces are in control situation.

Pursuant to this telegram the large war vessels at Key West, Havana and Guantánamo have been ordered north; the gunboats, auxiliaries and marines to remain. Inform consul at Santiago.

KNOX.

FILE No. 887.00/974.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

[Secret.]

No. 323.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Havana, July 3, 1912.

SIR: While there have been no radical developments since Estaniz was killed, I think I may safely say that the situation has improved to a remarkable degree, and that a very encouraging change is manifest in public confidence. It is, of course, impossible to predict with certainty what may happen so long as Ivoins and other leaders continue to elude capture, but it is now generally believed that the Government has the upper hand and will, with a proper display of energy, be able completely to crush the revolt.

I have, etc.,

A. M. BRADBURY.
The Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain to the Secretary of State.

No. 149.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
KING'S, Mr., July 22, 1918.

SIR: With reference to your notes Nos. 1540 and 1551 of the 20th ultimo and 1st instant respectively, I have the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to express the cordial thanks of His Majesty's Government for the readiness of your Government to instruct your Naval authorities in Cuban waters to offer protection to British lives and property during the late disturbances on the island.

I have [etc.]

(For H. M.'s Chargé d'Affaires)

ARCHIBALD KEER.

ASSAULT UPON THE AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES.

File No. 123.038/81.

The American Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Havana, August 27, 1918.

On entering Hotel Miramar this evening to dine I was assaulted from behind without warning or provocation by a reporter of La Prensa, who had been excluded from the Legation and Department of State for lying statements and is notorious for having figured in many unsavoury incidents. He knocked me senseless, and while in this condition he attempted to inflict further injuries. Saved from serious injury by Bell. Reporter immediately arrested. Have received telegraphic message from President Gibson, who is in the country, and calls from Secretary of State and other officials, who express regret and make spontaneous promise of serious prosecution.

In view of demoralizing effect of failure to press prosecution of assailant of Tarler in August, 1908, and hostile attitude of part of press towards United States at this time, I venture to recommend that Department express interest in proper prosecution.

GIBSON.

File No. 123.038/41.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister of Cuba.

No. 57.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 28, 1918.

SIR: The Department is in receipt of a telegram from the American Chargé d'Affaires at Havana stating that while entering the Miramar Hotel on the evening of August 27 he was assaulted from behind, without provocation or warning, by a reporter of La Prensa.

*Not printed.*

CUBA.

File No. 123.038/74s.

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Chargé d'Affaires.

[Telegram—Extract—Paraphrase.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 28, 1918.

Accept the Department's congratulations for the very good work done by the Legation.

In regard to your August 27, the Department has communicated with the Cuban Legation expressing its regret at the vicious and uncalled-for assault upon you August 27 and has requested that the Cuban Government take prompt and vigorous measures adequately to punish the offender. You will so inform the Cuban Government.

WILSON.


The American Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State.

No. 402.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Havana, August 29, 1918.

SIR: Referring to my telegram of August 27 and to my subsequent telegraphic correspondence in regard to the assault made upon me on the evening of the 27th instant, I have the honor to report as follows:

On leaving the Department of State on the 12th instant I was accosted by a number of Cuban reporters including one Enrique Maza, a reporter on the newspapers La Lucha and La Prensa of this city, who most insistently demanded that I inform him as to the subject of my conversation with the Cuban Secretary of State. I stated courteously but firmly I was not at liberty to discuss the matter and that they would have to secure any information they desired from Mr. Sanguly. This statement was accepted with perfectly good grace by all the reporters excepting Maza, who was very insistant and detained me for some minutes in conversation. Later in the day he called at the Legation stating that he had been sent by Mr. Sanguly, who was willing that I discuss with him the subject of our morning’s conversation. Knowing Maza’s character as I did, I was quite confident that Mr. Sanguly had not sent him to see me without advising me by telephone or otherwise. However, as Maza was in the employ of La Lucha, one of the editors of which...