NEGRO UPRISING IN CUBA.
<table>
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<td>Minister-Beaupré of State</td>
<td>1912 Feb 27</td>
<td>Negro agitations, led by Estenoz, may be revivied.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
<td>May 4</td>
<td>Habana stevedores strike; general strike threatened; Government will afford protection without representations from legation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
<td>May 20</td>
<td>Reports arrest of negroes for alleged revolutionary plot.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
<td>May 21</td>
<td>Negro movement widespread and alarming.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
<td>May 23</td>
<td>Cuban President hopes to be able to crush rebellion.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré (telegram).</td>
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<td>Quotes statement concerning Cuban conditions given out to-day.</td>
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<td>Minister Beaupré to Secretary of State (telegram).</td>
<td>May 24</td>
<td>Reports no possibility of agreement in strike situation; suggests sending marines to Key West.</td>
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<td>268</td>
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<td>May 25</td>
<td>Reports concerning agitation against Morua law.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré (telegram).</td>
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<td>Quotes reply of Cuban Government to note re sending of marines to Guantanamo.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gunboat will be ordered to Nipe Bay and naval force assembled in vicinity of Habana; forces will land if necessary, but this is not intervention.</td>
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<td>Minister Beaupré to Secretary of State (telegram).</td>
<td>May 26</td>
<td>Reports generally on strike situation; temporary arrangement between growers and strikers made.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President Gomez to President Taft (telegram).</td>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>Expresses opinion that American forces should not be landed in Cuba, and that the Cuban Government will be able to restore order.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strike of harbor laborers may be averted; stevedores willing to continue armistice 25 days; predicts serious danger of general strike greatly reduced.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
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<td>Communicates report on conditions at Santiago.</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>President Taft to President Gomez (telegram).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expresses gratification with efforts being made to put down disturbances, and says action of United States is entirely disassociated from question of intervention.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Gomez to President Taft (telegram).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expresses gratification with President's telegram.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré (telegram).</td>
<td>May 28</td>
<td>Informs him that requests for protection have been received and directs him as to course.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
<td>May 29</td>
<td>Quotes Gomez's message to President Taft, and directs that he explain to Gomez position of United States.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister Beaupré to Secretary of State (telegram).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quotes order given by Estenoz to one of his lieutenants directing drastic action be taken after June 1 if Morua law is not repealed.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
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<td>Gomez adds expressions of appreciation of United States attitude; campaign against rebels begins to-morrow.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
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<td>Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré (telegram).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
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<td>Directs biweekly report of movement of Cuban and revolutionary forces; directs that he have Cuban Government maintain guards at certain places.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Minister Beaupré to Secretary of State (telegram).</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
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<td>Considerably more apprehension apparent; whites arming.</td>
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<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
<td>June 3</td>
<td>La Maya burned by insurgents.</td>
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<td>Same to same (telegram)</td>
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<td>Gomez asks authority to suspend constitutional guarantees.</td>
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<td>192</td>
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<td>Informs him that landing of marines and sending of battleships is merely precautionary measure of protection; says Cuba's continued failure to protect life and property will compel intervention.</td>
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<td>Minister Beaupré to Secretary of State (telegram).</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré (telegram).</td>
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Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

No. 132.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, February 27, 1912.

Sir: With reference to Mr. Jackson's correspondence in 1910 (dispatch No. 62, of April 22, et seq.),* in regard to the arrest and indictment of Evaristo Estenso and other leaders of the "Partido Independiente de Colon" on the charge of inciting rebellion, I have the honor to report that the negro agitation which culminated in those arrests and which seemed at that time to be the forerunner of a race war in Cuba has recently shown signs of revival in several parts of the Republic.

Estenso and his followers have long sought to procure the repeal of the so-called Morua law, passed by the Cuban Congress in 1909 to prohibit the formation of "racial" political parties or their recognition under the electoral law. In view of the recent successful intimidation of the Government by the Veterans the Estenozistes apparently considered the present a most opportune moment to redouble their efforts. The Government realizes this and, having the Veteranista experience fresh in mind, is said to be prepared to take strong measures to put down the agitation without temporizing should it show signs of gaining headway.

As the Department already knows, Estenso is a troublesome negro agitator and, though he has a comparatively small following, might, in the present unsettled political situation, be capable of precipitating trouble of a serious nature. The negroes have always been the backbone of political uprisings in Cuba but under white leadership. As practically all the talented negroes and mestizos of political inclinations are well cared for by the Liberal and Conservative parties, the negroes themselves lack the necessary leadership and talent for organization to bring about unaided a widespread revolt. Therefore I do not think that the present agitation will be productive of anything more than the passing excitement which it affords. At the most a few sporadic outbreaks might occur, which could be readily put down by the army, which is not in sympathy with the negro movement.

I have, etc.,

A. M. BEAUPRÉ.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.—Extract.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, May 4, 1912—5 p. m.

Habana stevedores struck last night and general strike is threatened unless military orders Nos. 71 and 76 are enforced. Present strike seriously damages horticultural interests, which are almost entirely American,

*Not printed.

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(i)
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and important American shipping interests. Government, for political reasons anxious to conciliate stevedores, urging shipping interests to accept their demands. In the event of violence fear Government will not afford adequate protection without strong representations from the legation.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, May 20, 1912—12 noon.

Government last night arrested number of negroes in Provinces of Santiago, Santa Clara, and Pinar del Rio for alleged revolutionary plot. Some mounted and armed. Understood that plan was to seize all rural guard posts in these Provinces at sunset to-night. Considerable number of suspects, including Estenoz, have disappeared. Influence being brought to bear on the President to deal drastically with leaders. Government confident that movement is completely suppressed.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, May 21, 1912—3 p.m.

Negro movement evidently more widespread and alarming than at first appeared. Small parties of negroes in conflict with rural guard at various points. Several casualties in rural guard. Armed negro bands near Habana and at various points in Oriente and Santa Clara Provinces and possibly elsewhere. Cuban Central landing stage at Cruces burned by band of negroes yesterday. Leaders threaten to destroy further foreign property. Consul at Santiago reports considerable alarm there. Negroes at various points well armed and reported to be stealing horses. Consular agent at Sagua la Grande telegraphs reporting considerable alarm there. Government yesterday sent 300 troops to Oriente Province; 500 more sent this morning. Government somewhat alarmed and unable to determine who is behind movement. Highly improbable that negroes are undertaking movement without support from some other party or faction. President evidently disposed to deal severely with leaders and expresses confidence in his ability to crush movement with forces at his command.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, May 23, 1912—12 noon.

The President sends me word that he fears he will not be able with troops at his command to station on all foreign properties sufficient forces to guarantee absolute protection, but that he will go as far as possible in
this direction. He has considerably over 2,000 troops in the field in Orienté Province with strict orders to deal severely with the rebels. Further troops are being rushed to the front. The President hopes that severe methods will be so effective that he will be able to crush movement entirely within ten days. The Government explains absence of engagements on the ground that negroes are avoiding encounters, their first object being the destruction of property. The Hormiguero Sugar Co., near Cienfuegos, telegraphed this morning that armed negro bands were roaming through their property. Have applied for protection. Consular agent at Matanzas reports that 300 negroes are known to be missing from that city and that their attitude has been threatening. Authorities there claim to be without forces to protect property. Have applied for protection for Mantanzas Water Co. A British cruiser will arrive here tomorrow on a visit, which was announced by the British minister several weeks ago. Cuban Government has as yet made no public announcement of the visit and arrival of cruiser may cause some excitement.

Beaupré.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 23, 1912—12 noon.

The following has to-day been given press:

Information reaching the Department of State has indicated a serious state of disturbance in the easternmost Province of the Island of Cuba, especially in the neighborhood of Guantanamo and Santiago, where there are important American interests, which have already made representations to the Department to the effect that their property is being seized and the lives of their employees endangered, and have requested that the Government of the United States procure for them adequate protection. The Department of State has accordingly requested the Navy Department to send vessels and marines to the United States naval station at Guantanamo, which is near the center of the disturbance. The Prairie is to take 500 marines and join the Paducah and Nashville there.

These steps have, of course, been taken simply in order that, in case of necessity, protection may be accorded to the Americans in that vicinity.

You will explain to the Cuban Government that this action is being taken by this Government in the hope of somewhat steadying the situation and thereby assisting the Government of Cuba to put down the present uprising. Should situation require, additional vessels will also be ordered to Guantanamo.

Inform American consul Santiago.

Knox.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

**American Legation,**

**Habana, May 24, 1912—4 p. m.**

Stevedore strike. Steamship companies inform me there is no possibility of agreement; fifteen-day truce ends to-morrow at midnight. Stevedore and lightermen announce that they will then go on strike, with strong possibility of general strike in Habana and other cities. Steamship companies will continue to carry passengers and mails, but will refuse freight. In present crisis stoppage of foodstuffs and customs receipts would have serious effect. Suggest advisability of sending ships with marines to Key West, whence they could be quickly summoned in the event of trouble.

Beaufre.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

No. 268.]

**American Legation,**

**Habana, May 24, 1912.**

Sir: Referring to previous correspondence in regard to the present negro uprising, and as a matter of record, I have the honor to report as follows:

For the past two or three weeks there have been persistent rumors that Evaristo Estenoz and other leaders of the Independent Colored Party were organizing their followers for a concerted agitation in favor of the abrogation of the Morua law, which, as the Department already knows, prohibits the formation of political parties upon racial lines. As these negro leaders had been carrying on their propaganda without any apparent result for some months little attention was paid to the predictions of trouble made to the Central Government by the local authorities in the Provinces of Santa Clara and Oriente. It was not until the 18th that the Government realized that there was real foundation for the fears of the local authorities, and orders were issued immediately looking to the exercise of great vigilance to prevent violence.

As has since been learned, the movement was carefully prearranged and was intended to begin simultaneously in all parts of the island at sunset on Monday, the 20th instant. Some organized bands, however, appeared prematurely on the 19th. A number of them were promptly arrested in the Provinces of Habana, Pinar del Rio, Santa Clara, and Oriente. On the morning of the 20th news of the intended outbreak was finally made public by the Government, with a confident statement that the uprising had been crushed completely, and that it was the intention of the President to bring the leaders of the revolt to justice without loss of time. On the morning of the 20th there were various outbreaks in the four Provinces above named, numerous petty depredations were committed, and several small encounters took place between armed negro bands and the rural guard, there being several wounded on each side. On the morning of the 21st it became apparent that the movement was more widespread than was at first believed, and the gravity of the situation has apparently increased steadily from day to day.
Since the 21st instant there has been practically no movement on the part of the negroes in the Provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio, but the disorders in Santa Clara and Oriente have increased in seriousness.

On the night of the 20th instant the President despatched 300 troops to Oriente Province by train, and on the morning of the 21st 500 more were despatched. These have been followed by further detachments of troops as rapidly as they could be prepared for active service. The Government is apparently concentrating its efforts to Oriente Province in the belief that the disorders in Santa Clara are of minor importance. It is difficult to state with any degree of accuracy the number of insurrectionists actually in the field. The statements made public by the Government clearly underestimate the force of the negro bands, claiming that there are only a few hundred in the field. Reports received from our consular offices and from various reliable American and other foreign interests clearly indicate that there are from 1,500 to 5,000 men in the ranks of the rebels. While I am inclined to believe that this latter figure is considerably exaggerated, it was furnished Mr. Holaday, our consul at Santiago, by the governor of the Province, and it is, therefore, worthy of consideration. Against this force the Government has over 2,000 troops in the field, but it must be remembered that organized Government forces labor under a decided disadvantage in crushing small and scattered bands, who know every inch of the country in which they are fighting and who are able to maintain themselves as they go along without the delay incident to a more or less elaborate commissary system. It is admitted by various officers here that, if the insurrectionists are really in earnest, it will require a much larger force than has been put in the field to crush the uprising. The Government, from the beginning of the movement, has received offers from many individuals and organizations who desire to enlist on the side of the Government, but until yesterday the President stoutly maintained that he could easily quell the revolt with the regular armed forces at his command. Apparently, however, the Government has realized that the movement was much more formidable than had been admitted and yesterday offices were opened at various places on the island for the recruiting of volunteers, and the Veterans' Association in Habana began recruiting among its members at its headquarters.

There has thus far been no important engagement between the insurrectionists and the Government forces, the officers in command reporting that the insurrectionists were avoiding hostilities. The negroes are apparently confining themselves to small depredations, such as the stealing of horses and provisions, and have destroyed practically no property of value.

From the beginning of the movement I have been in close touch with the representatives of American companies in the disaffected districts and have, whenever there was any cause for alarm, applied to the Cuban Government for military protection.

On the 22d instant, on learning of the fears of various American companies in Oriente Province, I deemed it advisable to call upon Mr. Sanguily to discuss the entire situation in an informal and friendly way. While applying for protection for the Juraguá Iron Co., I told Mr. Sanguily that my representations on behalf of this and other American companies
should not be considered in the nature of complaints; that I felt and was confident that he also realized that the interests of the American and Cuban Governments were identical in the present crisis; and that the American Government was just as anxious as that of Cuba to avoid the necessity for an intervention. I went on to point out that the greatest danger now lay in possible failure to afford adequate protection to foreign lives and property, which might readily cause pressure to be brought upon the American Government by other foreign Governments to bring about an intervention for the benefit of their national interests. I went on to say that, although there had as yet been apparently no failure on the part of the Cuban Government to discharge its obligations in this regard, I deemed it the part of true friendship to point out this possible danger to the maintenance of Cuban independence and urged him to exercise every effort to avoid complications.

Mr. Sanguily expressed himself as thoroughly understanding and sincerely appreciating the force and spirit of my remarks, with which he said that he fully agreed. He informed me that he would go immediately to the palace and make clear to the President the vital necessity for exercising every possible effort to protect foreign property, urging him personally to issue instructions in harmony with the ideas expressed by me. While I had no instructions from the Department authorizing me to make such representations, I felt confident that I was stating elementary truths which were in complete harmony with the desires of the Department.

As a result of Mr. Sanguily's interview with the President a body of 180 troops was despatched to the various properties of the Juraguá Iron Co., and the officer in command in Oriente Province was directed to despatch small forces to the various foreign properties throughout the district and at the same time to arm their employees so that they might defend themselves if attacked. I am informed that these instructions were promptly obeyed.

The sending of the Prairie, Paducah, and Nashville to Guantanamo has made a very good impression here, and both the President and Mr. Sanguily express themselves as gratified by our action in the matter. It is difficult to say, however, what moral effect the presence of these ships will have upon the irresponsible negroes, who are unlikely to be greatly concerned over the possible consequence of their actions.

Upon receiving the informal note, in which I informed the Cuban Government of the sending of these ships to Guantanamo, Mr. Sanguily expressed his gratification and said, in what was apparently a burst of confidence, that he feared they might soon be very necessary. Upon being asked upon what he based his fears he hesitated, and finally said that this was merely an expression of his personal belief. I do not know how much importance should be attached to this remark of Mr. Sanguily, but report it as of possible suggestive value.

Aside from the fact that we have been unable to form an accurate estimate of the strength and extent of this movement, its most remarkable characteristic is that there is no definite knowledge of its real purpose. There are various theories advanced to account for the movement. The most prevalent belief is that the movement was initiated for the express purpose of provoking an American intervention for the benefit of various
interests which believed that they would profit by a change of government. A movement aimed at provoking intervention would naturally devote its first efforts to the destruction of foreign property, but, as I have already reported, very little has been done in this direction. Exponents of the intervention theory advance an ingenious explanation to account for the absence of serious attacks upon foreign property. I was yesterday informed that the uprising had been deliberately allowed to die out in the Provinces of Habana and Pinar del Rio in order to allay suspicion, while it had become more threatening in the eastern Provinces; that it was the intention of the negro leaders to maintain a threatening attitude, but avoid encounters with the Government troops with a view to forcing the Government to send as large a part of the armed forces to the Oriente, and that, when this had been accomplished, it was their intention to cut the telegraph wires and railroad communication and start a revolt along serious and violent lines in the western Provinces while the Government was unable to oppose them with adequate forces. While I have no confirmation of this plan it would appear to be a piece of elementary strategy which might occur to the negro leaders and which is worthy of at least the same consideration as the other rumors which are now circulating.

Another story is to the effect that the movement was started by President Gomez, who is said to have advanced funds to Estenoz with the understanding that they were to be devoted to a negro campaign in favor of the reelection of the President. It is said that these funds were not applied to the purpose for which they had been intended, but that they were expended instead for the purchase of arms in the outfitting of the present movement. Like all other rumors in regard to the present situation, this is absolutely without confirmation and sounds rather improbable.

La Ultima Hora, a sensational evening paper, last night published what purported to be the text of a confidential secret service report to the Government charging four individuals with being behind the present revolutionary movement. I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed copy and translation of this alleged report.* While the paper, out of a peculiar sort of caution, indicated these individuals merely by their initials, there is no doubt in anyone's mind that S. M. and F. S. are intended to indicate San Miguel and Frank Steinhart, respectively. I do not know who the other two individuals are supposed to be. The rumor that these individuals were behind the movement has had considerable circulation here, but I have been unable to secure the slightest confirmation for it. I may say that there is a very prevalent belief that these individuals are more or less implicated. Day before yesterday, in the course of a conversation, Mr. Sanguily informed me that, while the Government was unable definitely to fathom the backing and purpose of the revolution, it had good reason to believe that it had been fomented by "certain foreigners of prominence who had greatly prospered during the first intervention and naturally desired a return to old conditions". Like everything else connected with the present movement, these suspicions are based on no tangible proof of which I have any knowledge, but I deem it the part of wisdom to transmit my impressions on the subject as of possible interest to the Department.

*Not printed.
In summing up the situation I can not go further than to say that it would seem evident that the present movement is organized and directed by some unknown interest, it being highly improbable that the negroes at the head of the Independent Colored Party would be capable of engineering a movement on this scale. The negroes now in revolt are of a very ignorant class, and, although it may or may not be the intention of their leaders to attack foreigners and destroy their party, it would at any time require only a well-conceived appeal to their prejudices or cupidity to precipitate serious disorders. Although it is still impossible to make any predictions as to the future, I feel that our Government has acted most wisely in sending forces to Guantanamo in anticipation of possible eventualities.

I have, etc.,

A. M. Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, May 25, 1912—12 noon.

Mr. Sanguily replies as follows to my note notifying Cuban Government of sending of marines to Guantanamo:

It affords me pleasure to state that the Cuban Government is sincerely grateful for the good intention of the Government of the United States, although the Cuban Government at present needs only sufficient time in which to crush, as it will surely crush, the unjustifiable racial revolt in the eastern part of the island just as it has put down revolts breaking out in other Provinces, where, barely four days after, no armed parties are at large, and confidence is reawakening and public tranquility is growing.

Beaupré.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, May 25, 1912—1 p. m.

A gunboat will be ordered to Nipe Bay and a large naval force will be assembled at a convenient point in the vicinity of Habana, probably Key West. The Nebraska should arrive there to-morrow afternoon.

You will inform the Cuban Secretary of State that in the event of inability or failure on the part of the Cuban Government to protect the lives or property of American citizens in Cuba the Government of the United States, pursuant to its uniform custom in such cases, will land forces to accord necessary protection. This is not intervention.

Knox.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.—Extract.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, May 26, 1912—4 p. m.

Stevedores and lightermen walked out this morning, but are now loading a consignment of pineapples under direct arrangement between grower and strikers, grower paying difference between steamship company's tariff and stevedores' demands. This arrangement affects this shipment only, and it is not known whether similar arrangements will or can be made in future cases.

Beaupré.

President Gomez to President Taft.

[Telegram.—Translation.]

HABANA, May 26, 1912.

The Secretary of State of this Government informs me that he has received a note from the minister of the United States in this city advising him that the Government over which you preside has ordered a gunboat sent to Nipe Bay and the concentration of a naval force at Key West in anticipation of possible eventualities, so that in the event of failure or neglect of the Government to protect the life or property of American citizens forces of the United States will land on Cuban territory for their necessary protection, adding that these measures must not be considered specifically as an intervention; but as in reality they do not seem anything else, and the natural development of events, once these foreign troops landed, would accentuate that character, it is my duty to inform you that a determination of this serious character alarms and injures the feelings of a people loving and jealous of their independence, above all when such measures were not even decided upon by previous agreement between both Governments, which places the Government of Cuba in a humiliating inferiority through a neglect of its national rights, causing it the consequent discredit within and without the country, nor is the action of the American Government justified, because neither it nor any other Government in analogous circumstances would have displayed, as has that of Cuba, such an extraordinary activity in mobilization and operations, it being, as it is evident, that in only four days it has accumulated more than 3,000 men of the regular forces against the rebels, sending them from the west to the east by land and sea, and that in such a short time it has cleared the whole island, with the exception of a limited eastern territory, of armed parties to such an extreme that there does not exist a single one which will resist, neither in Pinar del Rio nor in this Province nor in Santa Clara, where, since the 19th instant, some of them appeared, who were punished and disbanded, and when on the other hand it has awakened public spirit, has distributed for the defense of farms and villages more than 9,000 rifles, with their corresponding supply of cartridges, and preparation is being made to flood with fighting patriots and with soldiers the relatively narrow zone to which the rebels have been reduced, the fact being really astonishing that up to the present no sugar mill has suspended work. I have recourse to you, therefore, as the loyal friend of Cuba and respectful of her rights, in order that with calm judg.
ment and highmindedness you may appreciate the facts set forth, sure that you will reach the conviction that this Government is very capable and sufficiently supported by the valor and patriotism of its people to annihilate a few unfortunates without a cause and without a flag. If you properly appreciate these facts you will hasten without doubt to recognize that it is not a friendly Government which, perchance, by way of an unjustifiable precaution, ought to precipitate itself in contributing to the discredit of a Government and a people like those of Cuba, placed, it is true, in circumstances difficult although not superior to the measures of its patriotism and its spirit.

José Miguel Gómez.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION, HABANA.

(Received May 27, 1912—8:05 p. m.)

My telegram May 26, 4 p.m. It now seems probable that strike of harbor laborers will be averted, pineapple growers apparently being willing to continue their direct arrangement with striking lightermen; stevedores are willing to continue armistice for 25 days. The growers will suffer great loss by this arrangement, but it seems to be the only way to save their crop. I think it safe to predict that the serious danger of a general strike is greatly reduced.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION, HABANA, MAY 27, 1912—11:00 p. m.

Consul at Santiago telegraphs the following:

May 27, 5 p.m.

The following is a résumé of nègres in revolt made by Colonel Vaillant from official information received at: rural guard headquarters: Ramon de las Yaguas, 400 to 700; Guantánamo, 300 to 500; San Luis, 300 to 400; Palmás Serisno, 300; Cobre, 250. Civil authorities state they are unable to make résumé on account of conflicting information, but insist that there are 4,000 in revolt. Forces have not yet sustained collision of any importance with rebels. Some criticism openly expressed on account of apparent lack of activity of forces. Up to present no destruction of valuable property, all reports to the contrary untrue. Apparently well-founded report Estenoz has declared that unless Government accedes to demand for repeal Morúa law contributions will be demanded of owners of estates and railroads to prolong conflict, with or without intervention, and failure of owners of property to comply with demand will result in their destruction. Reports indicate nègres are most active in Guantánamo district, where Estenoz and Ivoñet are operating, and that large bands of nègres continue to steal horses and to pillage small stores in unprotected places throughout that district. Five hundred additional forces arrived there yesterday and more favorable reports are hoped for from there soon. [Apparent omission] as should be carefully weighed as these avowed annexationists. I can not see any reason why the Cuban Government can not quell this revolt if energetic and immediate measures are adopted to suppress it, but the situation warrants adoption by our Government of every precautionary measure.

Beaupré.
President Taft to President Gomez.

[Telegram.]

The White House,
Washington, May 27, 1912.

I am sincerely gratified to learn of your Government's energetic measures to put down the disturbances and to know that you are confident of being successful. As was fully explained to the Cuban chargé d'affaires here, this Government's motive in sending ships to Key West, just as in sending the Prairie to the Guantanamo naval station, was merely to be able to act promptly in case it should unfortunately become necessary to protect American life and property by rendering moral support or assistance to the Cuban Government. As was made quite clear at the time, these ordinary measures of precaution were entirely disassociated from any question of intervention.

Wm. H. Taft.

President Gomez to President Taft.

[Telegram.]

Habana, May 27, 1912.

Exceedingly grateful for your cablegram, which, on appeasing Cuban patriotism with the assurance that the action of the Government under your worthy Presidency is limited to observe events in order to be ready, should it be necessary, to protect the lives and property of American citizens and to morally support the Cuban Government without having to land American forces in our territory, unless both Governments agree upon such extreme necessity, clearly shows, with the sincerity of the Government and of the people of the United States, their noble and friendly sentiments in favor of the Government and of the people of Cuba, who are determined to reestablish, as soon as possible, public peace, for which purpose they will not hesitate, no matter what sacrifices circumstances may impose upon them.

José M. Gomez.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, May 28, 1912—4 p. m.

Department has received request for protection of Americans residing at Victoria de Las Tunas, Oriente, Cuba. Make suitable representations to Foreign Office for protection. On receipt by you of similar requests take like action and reserve rights of reclamation for any damages suffered by Americans.

Knox.
The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.—Extract.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, May 29, 1912—1 p. m.

President Gomez has cabled the President the following as a rejoinder:

[See supra, May 27.]

This Government has taken the pains to make so absolutely clear its position and the absolutely evident distinction, on the one hand, between "intervention" and political acts under our treaty rights, which are not now contemplated, and, on the other hand, preparedness to land marines and the landing of marines if necessary in sporadic cases to prevent or suppress jeopardy to American life or property, that any further discussion would be worse than useless. Part of President Gomez's last message evidently seeks to read a singular misinterpretation into this Government's clear expressions. This Government does not undertake first to consult the Cuban Government if a crisis arises requiring a temporary landing somewhere to protect life and property on the broad-principles of international practice. You will clearly explain all this orally to President Gomez.

KNOX.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Habana, May 29, 1912—7 p. m.

From the beginning of the present movement leaders of negro bands have given receipts in the name of Estenoa for goods taken. Lewis, president of Guantanamo & Western Railway, who arrived this morning from Oriente, informs me that, when store of his sugar estate at Marcos Sanchez was robbed two days ago, leader of band, who could not read or write, gave what he evidently thought was receipt but which was really original order from Estenoa to his lieutenants, and in translation reads about as follows:

To the lieutenant [what? receives this and to all my other loyal lieutenants:

You are hereby informed that if by June 1 the Morua law is not repealed you will at once start to destroy all railroad bridges, telegraph and telephone lines, and other property of American ownership, and that if this does not accomplish our purpose with the present Government within 15 days thereafter you will start killing men not of our color irrespective of nationality.

Lewis has original document in his safe and has telegraphed for copy. If this is authentic and not spurious, document deliberately allowed to fall into foreign hands for the purpose of inspiring alarm, it would appear to be most significant indication we have had thus far as to intentions of leaders and reasons for lack of violence to date.

Lewis also showed me letter from Estenoa to him demanding 25 rifles and 5,000 rounds of ammunition, under penalty of destruction of his property.
Lewis states that he considers situation well in hand and is leaving for the United States to-morrow. He admits that he knows nothing of conditions outside of the immediate district of his properties.

Whitaker returned to-day from Oriente; reports that situation was no better and that all foreigners were extremely apprehensive.

I have to-day received a letter from Itonet stating that present uprising is not race war but movement of reform.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, May 29, 1912—9 p. m.

Your May 29, 1 p. m.
The President states that he is the first to recognize our rights under the circumstances named. He adds emphatic expression of appreciation of our Government's "fine attitude" throughout present crisis, which he says has been worth more to him than his entire army.

Says that real campaign will begin to-morrow or the next day, Monteagudo having arrived to-day to take command, with strict orders for severe measures.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, May 30, 1912—4 p. m.

Confidential. In delivering my note regarding protection of Spanish-American Iron Co., Gibson, under my general instructions to make strong supporting representations, had very frank but friendly talk with Patterson,* which I trust may stimulate authorities here to proper action. Gibson pointed out that failure to comply with repeated verbal and written assurances of protection was the one thing calculated to destroy our confidence in ability and willingness of Cuban Government to fulfill its obligations; that repeated failure to prevent threatened destruction of valuable property after reiterated representations and warnings would surely cause our Government seriously to consider the need for its giving protection to American interests; that if this was to be avoided Cuban Government must immediately come to a realizing sense of its responsibilities and take energetic steps. Patterson pointed out that it was local military authorities who were at fault, but Gibson replied that admission of inability of Cuban Government to secure obedience of its military officers was very serious, and that our Government looks alone to the Central Government for the protection of American interests. He added that Cuban Government should clearly understand perilous chances it was taking. Patterson cordially agreed and promised to use best efforts to bring military authorities to proper realization of responsibilities.

*Subsecretary of State.
The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 1, 1912—2 p. m.

Department to-day has sent following telegraphic instructions to consular officers in Cuba:

You will endeavor to keep yourself informed regarding political conditions throughout your district, and if disturbances arise in any locality threatening the lives or property of American citizens you will promptly communicate in the matter with the legation, which has been instructed to make suitable representations to the Cuban Government for protection.

On being advised by consular officers or otherwise of any serious situation threatening the lives and property of American citizens you will bring the matter to the attention of the Cuban Government with the request that suitable steps be taken to afford adequate protection.

KNOX.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 1, 1912—3 p. m.

Instruct consular officers hereafter to keep legation and Department informed by telegraph on Monday and Thursday of each week of movement of Cuban and revolutionary forces in their districts.

It is most important that you at once have the Cuban Government station and maintain regular guards of 200 men each at both Daiquiri and Firmenza and of 50 men at El Cobre for the protection of the Spanish-American, the Juragua, and Cuba Copper companies, respectively.

KNOX.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 1, 1912—12 midnight.

For several days I have been receiving persistent and consistent rumors of concerted negro uprising in Habana. Told large numbers bad negroes have left the city, many have bought weapons, and that there is much threatening talk. Although disclaiming knowledge of plan, President's private secretary is organizing local civil guard for the protection of Habana and Vedado. Because of these rumors there is much apprehension on the part of American residents. This afternoon I asked President Gomez whether he had knowledge of any such plan. He said that he was sure there was nothing of the sort intended; that he "had the negroes completely terrorized," although I know of nothing he has done to terrorize them. He states that he has ample forces to put down any movement, mentioning 1,000 troops, 1,000 police, and 1,000 local guards. I have reason to believe that this is decided overestimate. Military attache states
that there are at most 700 soldiers in the neighborhood. Chief of police has recently complained to member of legation that he has only a little more than 800 men, not enough to guard city in normal peaceful conditions. Local guard may be said to exist only on paper, as it has as yet no organization or arms and has never met or received instructions. While I am unable to secure enough definite information to make any prediction as to the likelihood of any such uprising, I venture, in compliance with the wishes of various local Americans, that anything of the sort would have serious consequences to our large colony, including more than 1,000 American women, most of them living in Vedado, which is insufficiently protected. The foregoing may be sufficient for the Department to determine whether it is advisable to send to Habana immediately one of the ships now at Key West with a force of marines. In any event I beg that this information be not given out at this time, for its publication would cause additional apprehension here.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation, Habana, June 2, 1912 — 4 p.m.

Confidential. Considerably more apprehension apparent to-day. Government permitting unlicensed carrying of arms by all white applicants. From apparently reliable information brought me to-day it is evident that negroes have bought large quantities of knives and other arms and that many negroes have left the city. I am informed that these facts have been daily reported to the President for some time past, and it would appear that he has deliberately attempted to mislead me as to the real state of affairs.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation, Habana.
(Received June 3, 1912 — 12:51 a.m.)

Following telegram just received from consul at Santiago:

La Maya, town of 4,000, completely destroyed by insurgents last night by fire. Defended by seven rurales.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation, Habana, June 3, 1912 — 11 p.m.

President to-day sent to Congress message asking for authority to suspend constitutional guaranties in accordance with section 2 of Article LXVIII of the Constitution. Asks discretionary authority to suspend guaranties in all or part of the Republic as circumstances may demand. Congress to meet to-morrow in special session to consider matter.

Beaupré.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 285.]  

American Legation, 

Habana, June 4, 1912.

SIR: It may be said with certainty that the Cuban Government is systematically endeavoring to create an unduly optimistic view of the present situation. Official announcements have on several occasions been made of brilliant Government victories which were purely imaginary, and every effort has been made to minimize the damage wrought by the revolutionists. The Government has, to my knowledge, failed to make public a number of reports concerning the destruction of foreign property in Oriente Province.

The Government has steadily maintained that the movement has been completely crushed, except in the Province of Oriente, whereas it may be said to be a matter of common knowledge that small and isolated bands of armed negroes are at large in all parts of the island. The legation has received from various private sources throughout the island reports that negro bands are committing petty depredations and that many of the so-called peaceful element are in more or less open sympathy with the rebels and may at any time join forces with them. Whites throughout the Republic continue to grow more apprehensive as time goes on and there seems to be a continuance of disorder. As I previously reported, large numbers of Americans and other foreigners have abandoned their homes in the country and have taken refuge in the larger towns.

For the past four or five days considerable apprehension has existed in and around Habana. The Government itself, although strenuously denying that there was any ground for fear, has taken the most exaggerated precautions to prevent an uprising. The contradiction between the Government's action and its denials of apprehension have created a decided feeling of apprehension in the city, probably much greater than if the Government had frankly made public its reasons for fearing an outbreak. Since Saturday last the Government has been distributing arms rather indiscriminately among the whites in Habana and suburbs, and the entire police force has been kept on continuous duty. Various stories have been circulated to the effect that the negroes in Habana were preparing for an armed uprising, and color has been lent to these stories by the fact that a considerable number of negroes have been placed under arrest charged with conspiracy against the Government.

Although the President flatly denied in a recent conversation that there was or had been any attempt by the negroes in Habana to organize an uprising, I am reliably informed that he has received repeated reports as to meetings of disaffected negroes and the sale of large quantities of knives and other arms to them. It remains to be seen whether he will act with sufficient vigor upon the information which he has received.

It may not be amiss at this time to call the Department's attention to my telegram of May 29, 7 p. m., wherein I quoted what purported to be instructions from Estenoz to his lieutenants. It will be noted that the active destruction of foreign property began on the night of May 31, about the time indicated in this instruction, whereas the negro leaders would have
found it far less difficult to carry out their purposes in this regard during the first days of the rebellion and before the arrival of the Government forces, which undoubtedly seriously interfered with the attacks of the negroes upon a large number of the more important foreign properties. I have, etc.,

A. M. Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Havana, June 5, 1912—7 p.m.

My June 5, 1 p.m.* Sanguily merely wished to discuss general question of landing forces. He said that Cuban Government thoroughly understood that American Government reserved right to land forces in its judgment. He states that all possible facilities in the way of supplies, transportation, and cooperation will be given our troops. He said his Government welcomed the sending of marines to Guantanamo City and that the Cuban troops thus relieved from guard duty would be immediately put in the field. He asked me to transmit the President’s request that the officers in command of our forces be instructed to deliver to the municipal authorities any rebels who surrender or are captured by them. This is for the purpose of combating belief among the negroes that by surrendering to Americans they will become prisoners of war and will be released upon the termination of hostilities. Sanguily also suggested as his own idea the desirability of some definite understanding as to the scope of operations of American and Cuban forces in case our Government should decide to send a large expedition. He pointed out that a complete and clear understanding of what was to be done by each nation would promote harmonious and effective operations and would avoid otherwise inevitable conflicts of authority. He believes, however, that the chief value of such an agreement lies in the reassuring effect its publication would have on opinion here. He said that although the Cuban Government thoroughly understood our attitude and the more intelligent Cubans approved the landing of troops there is still a considerable element of suspicion among ignorant classes which, unless successfully combated by some such means, might complicate situation. He also believes it would have wholesome effect on negroes in that it would show that we are determined to lend our support to the constituted Government of all classes as against a movement of a portion of one class. Although further reiteration of our real purposes and of our intention to avoid if possible an intervention may seem superfluous and tiresome I venture to support Mr. Sanguily’s suggestion on the ground that no amount of repetition is excessive in convincing the ignorant classes here of the baselessness of their instinctive prejudices and suspicions. In conclusion Mr. Sanguily stated that although he had no authority from the President to ask for the sending of more troops he could state that it was the intention of the Cuban Government immediately to employ in active operations any troops relieved by the arrival of our forces.

Beaupré.

*Not printed.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.—Extract.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 5, 1912—10.45 p.m.

Congress to-day authorized the President to suspend constitutional guaranties in Oriente Province.

Beaupré.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 5, 1912.

Under the exigencies of the situation arising out of the failure of the Cuban authorities to take effective action for the protection of American life and property the commandant at Guantanamo naval station has been compelled to land four companies of marines. This action has been taken as a measure of protection only and not for the purpose of putting down the insurrection, which is clearly the duty of Cuba. Four large war vessels will forthwith be sent from Key West to Guantanamo to be in readiness in case the situation should unfortunately demand additional forces for the same purpose. It is hoped that these measures will at once awaken the Cuban Government to the necessity of promptly and adequately meeting and discharging its duties and responsibilities, and you will vigorously impress upon the President of Cuba that a continued failure on the part of his Government adequately to protect life and property will inevitably compel this Government to intervene in Cuba under and in response to its treaty rights and obligations.

Knox.

Consul Holaday to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Santiago de Cuba, June 6, 1912—12 noon.

Collister* arrived Santiago last night and immediately reported consulate; Wheeler* safe at ranch; neither he nor Wheeler held in captivity. Estenoz sent the following message to me to be transmitted to the Department:

The statement of Collister of what Estenoz said:

Under present conditions the negro has no chance in this country, and the purpose of the warfare which we are carrying on is to secure for him the civic rights to which he is, in common with other Cubans, entitled under the constitution of the Republic and for which he fought so many years. We are carrying on a civilized warfare. We are not robbing or molesting women. We are not murdering whites, nor have we any intention of so doing, as the Cuban Government is continually stating is our purpose. We are not making warfare against foreigners, and we hope they will not take sides in this difficulty. We are solely fighting

*American citizens previously reported captured by revolutionists.
Cubans and the Cuban Government for our rights as Cubans and citizens of this country, which, under this administration up to the present time, we have not had, and rather than that hereafter suffer the present unbearable conditions we prefer to fight and die, and, furthermore, I desire to state that rather than be governed by the Cubans in the way we have been in the past it would be much preferable to be governed by strangers.

It has come to my knowledge that the American mining companies have armed their Callejo laborers and I have advised them not to allow these men to enter the conflict against us, for if they do we will retaliate by killing every Callejo on whom we can lay our hands. The present Cuban Government has endeavored to make the people believe that this is a race war, but this is not true, as evidenced by the fact that we have many white men in our ranks and, furthermore, a race war would be an absolute impossibility in Cuba because, with the exception of a few white foreigners, all would be on one side. I burnt the buildings of the Spanish-American Iron Co. for the purpose of notifying the world that I had started and was carrying on a revolution in Cuba. I regretted the necessity of doing this and also the taking of property, such as horses, saddles, arms, etc., but this is absolutely necessary to the success of the enterprise, as it would be impossible to carry on a revolution by organizing a band of men and sitting quietly under a mango tree. Any agreement made between me and the Cuban Government for the purpose of settling this affair would have to be made in the presence of a representative of the United States of America and only upon the assurance of this representative that the United States of America would guarantee the absolute fulfillment of the agreement made by the Cuban Government, as the officials of the Cuban Government have made many promises to me in the past and as yet none of them have been fulfilled. All that we ask is our rights as citizens, and we hope the American people will understand our position and will study the matter very carefully before they become satisfied that intervention is necessary.

HOLADAY.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 287.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 6, 1912.

Sir: Referring to previous correspondence in regard to the present negro uprising in Cuba, I have the honor to submit the following observations for such consideration as the Department may deem appropriate:

While the situation is very serious and rapidly tending toward a condition which will render intervention inevitable, it seems to me that there is still an opportunity for the adoption of a policy or line of action which might result in a better state of affairs.

It has been my understanding that you earnestly desired to avoid another intervention in Cuba, and I have, therefore, labored constantly to that end since I have been here. A most corrupt and profligate government, alike regardless of the material interests and prosperity of the Cuban people and of its moral obligations to our Government, has been the most discouraging element with which I have had to deal, and it seems to be hopeless to expect any improvement in this respect unless the American Government can exercise a more direct and emphatic control of the finances of the country than it now possesses.

I would be entirely out of sympathy with any effort to sustain the present Government or any other administration that may take charge of the Cuban affairs in the near future were it not for the conviction that
intervention, occupation, or annexation would be contrary to our traditional policy and to your expressed wishes and, therefore, to be avoided by all reasonable and honorable means.

There is no doubt in my mind that the present uprising in Oriente is extremely serious, far more serious than the Cuban Government appears to realize or, at any rate, than it is prepared to admit.

If the present tactics are continued there is every reason to believe that the uprising will not be put down for months, or even years, without material assistance or intervention by the American Government.

The greatest burden now resting on the Cuban Government is the protection of foreign property. There is in the disaffected district a huge amount of valuable property belonging to American, British, French, German, and Spanish citizens and companies. All of these interests are most insistent in their demands for military protection and bitter in their complaints unless the Cuban Government accedes to the letter of their demands. In order to afford anything approaching the protection demanded by foreign interests here it would require forces greatly in excess of those now at the despatch of the Cuban Government at a time when that Government should devote to active operations every soldier it can command.

It may be said in passing that Cuban interests in Oriente are receiving practically no protection because of the fact that so much pressure is being brought to bear on behalf of foreigners. In this connection it will be noted that the Cuban Government, aside from the fact that it has a comparatively inadequate force, labors under a serious disadvantage which was never felt by the Spanish Government in its operations in this same part of the country. Except in very special instances, the Spanish Government did not pretend to afford the same degree of protection which is now demanded of the Cuban Government as a matter of right by large numbers of foreigners. In the days of the revolution against Spain foreigners, like natives, were obliged to accept the fortunes of war and content themselves with such indemnity as they could secure upon the termination of hostilities.

With the best will in the world, the Cuban Government can offer only relative protection, but most of the foreign interests in Oriente quite fail to make any distinction between the interest of the Cuban Government in protecting their property in order to avoid the subsequent claims for damages and their own absolute right to demand and obtain complete security in spite of the troubled conditions now existing.

Although the Cuban Government had not requested the landing of marines for the purpose of affording protection to foreign property, the President expressed his gratification on learning of the fact that a force of marines was landed at Guantanamo yesterday, and, as I had the honor to report by telegraph, sent me word that as rapidly as American forces arrived for the protection of different foreign properties the Cuban troops stationed there would be promptly withdrawn and devoted to active operation against the rebels.

Secretary of State Sanguily went further than this in stating to me that, although he had no authority to ask for the sending of further forces, he could assure me that whenever further American troops landed the Cuban troops relieved by them from guard duty or from police duty would be also sent to increase the forces in the field. He said this in such a way
as to intimate that the landing of American forces for this purpose would materially aid the Cuban Government in crushing the rebellion.

Aside from the fact that assistance of this sort coming from us would tend to hasten the reestablishment of normal conditions in Cuba, it would seem evident that we will be obliged to land further forces in the very near future. Those landed are insufficient to protect any great amount of property and I have already received appeals from a number of interests who claim to have equal rights with the American companies in the Guantanamo district to American protection. My British and Brazilian colleagues have already expressed surprise that forces landed have been devoted entirely to the protection of American property, and the former stated to me last night that, unless American or Cuban protection was forthcoming for his nationals in the Guantanamo district by this morning, he intended to cable the Foreign Office in London to urge that representations be made in Washington with a view to having forces of American troops assigned to various British properties in the disaffected districts. I fear that this is merely the beginning of a general demand that American protection be afforded to foreign interests in Oriente. If, either through our own determination thus to aid the Cuban Government to suppress the uprising or through compliance with foreign demands for protection, we eventually release the Cuban forces from police duty so that their entire efforts can be devoted to the prosecution of a campaign against the rebels, it may be confidently said that the chances of a successful outcome will be greatly increased.

There is one difficulty facing the Cuban Government which is to my mind far more serious than the military problems confronting the army, and that is the perilous financial condition of the Government. As the Department already knows, the Government was in a decidedly bad way financially before the outbreak of the present uprising. During the last two weeks this condition has grown steadily worse. A very large proportion of the Government’s income is derived from customs revenue and this is steadily decreasing. The general state of apprehension existing throughout the island has caused the canceling of a great many of the orders already placed abroad by Cuban merchants and few new orders are being made, those being confined chiefly to foodstuffs and cheap imperishable materials.

I understand that the feeling of distrust extends even to the purchase of lottery tickets, from which the Government derives an important revenue, and that the sale of tickets has fallen off greatly. It is said that this is due both to the fact that many people are confused by need for economy at the present time and also to a certain suspicion that the money derived from the sale of the tickets may be devoted in too great an extent to the uses of the Government.

As the prosecution of an active campaign on any considerable scale will of course require a large financial outlay, it seems highly probable that the Government will soon be obliged to seek a foreign loan. Under the existing conditions it would seem improbable that any responsible banking house would be prepared to make such a loan without substantial guarantees, and would probably demand them from our Government.
It seems to me that the floating of a new loan would offer us an extremely good opportunity to be of real assistance to the Cuban people by putting our own conditions upon the granting of the loan in order to make sure of its honest application. It would seem that this might readily be made to entail some more or less active fiscal control, which would protect the Cuban treasury against the wholesale looting to which it has hitherto been subjected. As is of course well known, Cuba is naturally so rich a country that an honest administration of her finances would in a short time place the Government in a very stable and prosperous position, and would enable an honest administration to accomplish much for the country which would be impossible if it were to take over the machinery of government and the burden of debt and disorder which now exists.

In closing, I desire to impress upon the Department the fact that my observations in this regard are based upon no admiration for the existing Government in Cuba, as to which my opinion should be sufficiently well known, but rather upon a desire to offer some possibly helpful suggestions toward the attainment of what I understand to be the desires of the Department in carrying out its policies with regard to Cuba.

I have, etc.,

A. M. Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,

Habana, June 7, 1912—11.15 a. m.

President Gomez called Cabinet meeting yesterday, evidently to consider representations made by me in pursuance of Department’s telegraphic instructions received on Wednesday evening.* After the meeting Mr. Sanguily issued the following statement, ostensibly based upon a telegram received from the Cuban minister in Washington:

I believe we Cubans are in a really critical situation, which the Government intends to overcome by extraordinary effort, being confident of the resolution and patriotism of the country, which the Government does not doubt will act of its own accord, responding without hesitation to these high purposes, so that no one may be ignorant of or much less undervalue the sacrifices of the Cuban people to avoid a foreign intervention in this international conflict, thus showing in their purpose full unity of action, their capacity for the independent life of the Republic.

President Gomez subsequently issued a manifesto calling for volunteers “to combat the present movement against civilization”.

He states that he hopes Congress will to-day appropriate sufficient funds to enable him to arm the whole country against the movement, which it is his firm intention to crush in the shortest possible time. The entire press is cordially supporting the President.

Beaupré.

*Telegram of June 5.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, June 7, 1912—7 p. m.

Ferrara, Speaker of the House of Representatives, left here this morning on an unannounced trip to Washington via Key West. I am reliably informed that he is sent as special representative of President Gomez to point out to the Department the difficulties of the present situation and ask further aid in protecting property, but more particularly to plead for time to crush rebellion. This information is derived from private sources, Cuban Government not having been frank enough to tell me of its decision.

Beaupré.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to Minister Beaupré.

[Enclosure No. 3, Despatch No. 292, June 11, 1912.—Translation.]

No. 622.

Republic of Cuba,
Department of State,
Habana, June 8, 1912.

Mr. Minister: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note No. 207,* of the 5th instant, inclosing copy of a note of the same date which you addressed to the President, quoting in part a cablegram which your excellency had received from your Government to the effect that the situation had compelled the commandant of the naval station at Guantanamo to land four companies of marines, and that this action had been taken solely as a measure of precaution and not for the purpose of putting down the rebellion. The cablegram in question also announced the sending of four warships from Key West to Guantanamo for a similar purpose should the situation require additional forces, and, in conclusion, expressed the hope that these measures would bring the Cuban Government to a realizing sense of the necessity of promptly and adequately attending to its duties and responsibilities.

Following the quotation from the cablegram here in reference, your excellency added that the Government of the United States desired to announce, through the authorized medium of your excellency, that it would, under certain conditions mentioned and in the event of the continuance of those conditions, be unavoidably compelled to intervene.

And although this announcement of a contingency which, as it is apparently desired to convey, may soon arise is predicated upon observations that are more or less debatable, since your excellency's Government must, from the attitude assumed, have felt justified, from its point of view, to make such observations, I shall not of course examine them closely, nor is it incumbent upon me or appropriate to discuss them; for in these times of trial for their country it is not meet for Cubans to place themselves in the light of thwarting the action of the American Government, more especially because they should not allow themselves for a single instant to

* Transmitting Department's instruction. See supra, telegram of June 5.
doubt the good faith or intentions of the American Government concerning the stability of this Republic.

But even though, as is natural, the Republic endure, permit me, Mr. Minister, in discharge of my conscience and in behalf of the Cuban Government, to be so honestly frank with you as to say that the intervention which has been initiated and is being prepared is in no sense justified.

Inasmuch as it is our affairs—matters of the utmost transcendence, that are really and essentially vital—that are at stake, it will not be denied that we have, at least conjointly with the right, the duty to judge the acts of others which so profoundly and absolutely concern us, which to such a degree affect our existence and our pride; for it is true beyond doubt that our Government has not failed in its earnest endeavor to combat the racial uprising and adequately to protect the lives and property of American citizens, since it is a notorious fact that no American property had been destroyed nor had the life of any American citizen been endangered prior to the landing of the American marines. In the short space of two weeks the Cuban Government has really performed wonders; indeed, not every government, even among the best, would, in view of the peculiar circumstances and the exceptional nature of the present conflict, have acted with equal diligence and such extraordinary success.

No one better then your excellency can bear witness to my assertions, acquainted as you are with the great difficulties with which the Cuban Government has had to contend, to the extent even of having had to suspend military operations, or modify the most carefully prepared plans, because of the pressure brought by foreign property owners, or their resident managers, who have contributed so greatly to inciting and keeping alive the alarm, especially abroad, with their fatidical clamors for protection for their industries, farms, or dwellings, while the natives, without legations to which to appeal, were left completely unprotected.

Your excellency knows that this is an island as narrow as it is mountainous; that the population is relatively sparse and distributed over vast solitudes despite the great progress of all kinds lately made; and that with the whites coexist an enormous mass of peoples of African extraction, many of them awakened to the highest ambitions and most unattainable desires through the fault, be it said, of the governments which have ruled the country during the past quarter century, without exculpating any of them, though the sins of all arose from the noblest and most generous impulses, which, unfortunately, were productive in the long run of no other result—as is now clearly apparent—than the condensation of inconceivable odium that has in the end broken out in an explosion of barbarism; and so, too, has your excellency been able to see through the intentions of the insurrectionists as proclaimed by their leaders and published in the press, which conclusively show either their racial hatred of their white fellow countrymen—who, with a lack of foresight equaled only by the excess of their affection, had pampered and elevated them—or the woeful unconsciousness of those who, perhaps, have lent themselves as blind instruments of soulless intriguers, for the preverse authors of the uprising, alleging fantastic grievances, admit that they have the astounding intention of burning foreign property in order to force upon the United States the necessity for intervention in the absurd and grotesque hope that,
as on a former occasion in dealing with the whites, the United States would enter into arrangements with them after first turning out the government that opposed them.

And in but 15 days this Government, despite so many setbacks, swept the western Provinces of the stupid rebellion and has reduced it to the limited zone of Oriente Province, where, ceaselessly and tirelessly, it pursues the villainous bands into the very heart of the rough mountains in which they have taken refuge in order safely to plot the destruction of the property of whites or diabolical assaults upon the honor of white women.

In such circumstances the Cuban Government is of the belief that more could not be expected of it, and that more could not have been done by any government under the same conditions; and therefore so quickly and unjustly to declare the Government a “failure” in this sense is not only to commit a great injustice but to discredit it without purpose and without even advantage to anyone. Now that so many negroes have learnt a lesson, or have repented, it is not to be assumed that the uprising so resolutely prosecuted will extend to or break out in the western Provinces, and, too, the assurance can be vouchsafed that in the affected zone, where the indefatigable and vigorous prosecution of our troops and of our enthusiastic volunteers have the movement cornered and almost in its last gasps, it will soon—as soon as is humanly possible, but, in any event, in a very short time—be broken up and overcome, without outside assistance and alone by the efforts of the Government and the patriotic and valorous cooperation of our people, because, in fine, the conscience and will of the nation have so irrevocably resolved. For these legitimate reasons, I can really see no objection (but, in fact, positive advantages) to the United States Government—placing itself in our position and considering the efforts we have put forth, the sufficient means at our disposal, and the unanimity with which the country has responded to our call to crush, in one definite and supreme attack, the criminal uprising which is already beginning to show signs of agony—deferring its preparations (if, indeed, it be true that such preparations are being made) for such time as may reasonably be considered necessary for Cuba to put the finishing touches to its work, the time that the American Government itself would need were it in our place; thus preventing the discredit of a friendly government such as ours, in regard to which there are those who already look forward with indecent anxiety to its disacknowledgment by the Government which, on the contrary, should give encouragement and reinforce it with all the prestige of its sympathy and consideration.

Nevertheless, howsoever this procedure of your excellency’s Government is regarded, and notwithstanding that the news of an impending intervention of a nature and extent at present unknown has created wide consternation, for my own part, as also for the part of my Government, Mr. Minister, after the protestations from Washington and the assurances which your excellency yourself has been good enough to give me in several interviews (which I conveyed to the President and communicated to our people, and which brought comfort and confident buoyancy to the minds of everyone), we are of the number who in the present case attribute to the American Government the purpose of preparing an intervention in our internal
affairs of a different character, more honorable to the people and Government of the United States, and at the same time more decorous and consoling for Cubans and the civilization which they represent, to many of whom memories have recurred of past interventions.

The rectitude of the intentions and the unwavering purpose of the United States to support and maintain, through the vicissitudes of our national development, the independence of the Island of Cuba having always, in the end, been plainly manifested, any possibility, Mr. Minister, is conceivable to me in human affairs, save that the friendly relations between the American Government and people and the Cuban Government and people (whose mutual affection and concord no circumstance should, for the honor of the United States and the happiness of this people, ever diminish and much less destroy) should not continue, if possible, more solid, more intimately sincere, and more cordial.

I avail myself, etc.,

MANUEL SANGUILY, Secretary.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 9, 1912—1 p. m.

Urgent. Since Friday night disorders in Habana and suburbs have been assuming character of race war. Antinegro demonstration of large proportions last night in center of city by disorderly and irresponsible elements and clashes in every quarter of the city and vicinity. A number of negroes killed and many wounded. Negroes are being goaded into violence and retaliation, which may have disastrous consequences. In spite of threats to deal severely with trouble makers authorities showing usual weakness. Chief of police states confidentially that he fears serious trouble. Americans, other foreigners, and many Cubans extremely apprehensive and appeal for sending of a war vessel. The size of our colony and large number of American women it contains places heavy responsibility upon our Government as regards possible consequences of racial trouble. Although conditions may grow no worse, I feel that a war vessel should be sent immediately for moral effect and to calm general apprehension.

Beaupré.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 9, 1912—8 p. m.

Your June 9, 1 p. m. Two war vessels will forthwith be ordered to Habana.

KNOX.
The Secretary of State to Minister Beaurpré.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, June 10, 1912—4 p. m.

Mr. Ferrara called upon me this morning with a letter from President Goméz accrediting him with a private and confidential mission, and in conversation Mr. Ferrara indicated that the reports as to the situation in Cuba had been very much exaggerated to this Government and that it was particularly important that the Cuban Government itself should put down the insurrection in order to discourage insurrections in the future hoping to provoke American intervention. He expressed no disapproval of protection of American interests by the marines now landed or such as might be landed, but expressed the hope that they would not be called upon to suppress the insurrection, leaving that to the Cuban forces. He expressed an anxiety that something friendly to the Cuban Government should emanate from this Government. I told him that the United States is not contemplating intervention in Cuba, but hopes and believes the Cuban Government will, by prompt and effective measures, be able to suppress the insurrection, and that the sending of the vessels to Habana last night indicates no change in this Government's policy of nonintervention. The vessels were sent solely to provide some place and means of safety and protection for Americans and other foreigners in the event of disturbances that might seriously menace their safety, and for such moral effect as they might have to calm the situation. Rivero has been to the Department urging that the ships be withdrawn from Habana. What are your views concerning this request? Rivero makes the most positive assurances that no one was killed in the troubles in Habana or seriously hurt except one white man. Confer fully with Admiral Osterhaus.

Knox.

Minister Beaurpré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, June 10, 1912—12 midnight.

Department's June 10, 4 p. m. From the first it has been most difficult to make accurate estimate of the true situation because of the peculiar character of the insurrection, distance from the field of operations, and, above all, because of complete failure of Government to be fair and frank with me. I have exercised the greatest care in verifying the information which has reached me, and I wish to state in the most emphatic terms that all statements made upon my own authority have been sent to you only after the most thorough verification and are entirely accurate. Any unverified statements I have transmitted textually in quotations or have given my authority in order that the Department might form its own opinion of them. From everything that I am able to learn I believe that the consul at Santiago, our chief source of information in Oriente, is thoroughly reliable and conservative, and I give his statements much more credence than those of the Cuban Government. The Government has never been frank
with me, and latterly has been furnishing me with reports from the troubled zone so manifestly manufactured to suit its purposes that I hesitate to believe any of its statements. Quite recently it has clearly appeared to me that the Government considered it necessary to convince American Government that the insurrection was crushed in order to avoid intervention, which it seems to believe imminent in spite of protestations of confidence in our intentions. Rivera's statement as to disorders on Saturday night are incorrect. My information as to casualties was derived from oral reports made from time to time during disturbances by police officials to the chief of police in the presence of the two secretaries of this legation, who were with him until a late hour of the night. Rivera's statements with regard to this matter are quite in line with the policy of his Government in suppressing and distorting news regarding the true situation, which has been a matter of common knowledge for some time and has added materially to the existing feeling of uncertainty and apprehension. See my June 9, 9 p.m.,* and June 10, 8 p.m.* As regards withdrawal of ships, I can only say that my telegram of June 9, 1 p.m., was sent only after much thought and careful consideration. There has been no change in the situation, although constant rains have prevented disorders, and if the sending of the ships was warranted in the first instance I am convinced that there is now no reason for their withdrawal. To-day I gave Admiral Osterhaus the substance of my June 9, 1 p.m., and such additional information as I had. He said that he thought the vessels should remain for a time for moral effect, even if not upon far more serious duty. Will consult further with him to-morrow.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, June 11, 1912—12 noon.

Department's June 10, 4 p.m. Confered fully with Admiral Osterhaus this morning. He had already cabled Navy Department recommending that ships remain at Habana for the present. After full discussion he expresses himself as still of the same opinion.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

No. 291.]

American Legation,
Habana, June 11, 1912.

Sir: Referring to my telegram of June 9, 1 p.m., and to subsequent correspondence in regard to the racial disorders in Habana, I have the honor to report as follows:

On Friday the legation received information from several sources to the effect that clashes between whites and blacks might be expected to begin at any time. The trouble first broke out at Regla, a small town across the bay from Habana, on Friday night, when a number of negroes

*Not printed.
were attacked and beaten and, according to the newspapers, two negroes were killed outright or died as a result of their injuries. I have not been able to confirm this latter report, as the Government has consistently denied even such casualties as have been a matter of positive knowledge to the legation. The disorders in Regla continued throughout the day on Saturday, frequent firing being heard in Habana, but it appears that not much damage was done except that a number of negroes were badly beaten; the majority of the colored population left the town that day and have taken refuge in Habana or small neighboring towns.

On Saturday morning the legation was informed that trouble might be expected that evening in Central Park, the principal square of this city, as a crowd of irresponsible young loafers, who frequent that part of town, had announced their intention of driving the blacks off the streets. Late in the afternoon the Vice-President informed me that he had just warned President Gomez of these serious disturbances and that he should take all possible precautions.

A little after 9 o'clock that evening a number of negroes were attacked by crowds of whites armed with revolvers. At least one was killed in the center of town and two or three more in various parts of the city and suburbs, the disorders having spread with great rapidity. Large numbers of negroes were beaten and the receiving hospitals were kept busy until a late hour of the night. Although warning had been given the Government of these outbreaks, it had failed to take adequate precaution, and it was some time before sufficient forces were on the ground to clear Central Park and hold the largest crowds in check.

On hearing of the trouble Mr. Gibson and Mr. Bell, the two secretaries of this legation, went to Central Park, where they met Colonel Aguirre, chief of police. At his invitation they remained with him in a café on the square, where he established himself to receive reports from his subordinates. He remained there until after 2 o'clock in the morning, receiving frequent verbal reports from his subordinates as to occurrences in various parts of the city, and it was from this source that I gained the information contained in my telegram of June 9, 1 p.m. Colonel Aguirre stated in confidence at that time that the disorders would probably increase in seriousness as soon as the "bad" negroes should have an opportunity to organize, those injured that evening having been for the most part inoffensive negroes who were attacked simply because of their color. At the same time Colonel Aguirre said that it was the intention of the Government to order all the forces at its command to active guard duty to prevent further troubles. He said that, in anticipation of trouble, he had kept the entire police force on practically continuous duty day and night for four days, and that they were so completely tired out that, unless they were given some relief, they would soon be unable to render effective service.

It was fully expected that serious disorders would occur on Sunday evening when the Government intended to permit a band-concert in the Central Park, which on Sunday nights is frequented almost exclusively by negroes. It was expected that the worst elements would appear at this time and be only too-ready for trouble. As it happened, however, torrential rains began on Sunday morning and have continued almost constantly, there having been a heavy downpour on both Sunday and Monday even-
ings. This, of course, prevented the gathering of large crowds out of doors and the consequent opportunity for precipitating trouble. In spite of this, the Government had large forces of police, soldiers, rural guard, and local volunteers stationed throughout the city patrolling all the principal streets.

For some days I have received frequent appeals from Americans and others residing in Habana and vicinity, expressing their apprehensions in regard to possible outbreaks. These appeals have been almost invariably accompanied by an expression of the hope that an American warship would be sent to Habana for moral effect. It may be said without exaggeration that a large number of the various foreign colonies and a large number of Cubans were in a state of apprehension closely bordering upon panic. The amount of feeling aroused by the disorders of Saturday night and by the reports of outrages received from Oriente had also produced a very dangerous state of mind which entailed, and undoubtedly still entails, great potentialities of trouble. For these reasons and in view of the importance of the American colony in Habana and its suburbs containing many American women, it seemed to me that a very heavy responsibility rested upon the American Government and upon me in the event of serious racial disorders.

Therefore, after much thought and careful consideration of the possible effects of the step, I decided that the only course open to me was to ask for the sending of a warship to Habana for moral effect and to calm the general feeling of apprehension. From what I am able to observe, since the arrival of the ships yesterday, the effect has been all that could be desired. A general feeling of relief is evident in the foreign colonies of Habana and apparently a large part of the Cuban population expresses decided satisfaction at our action in sending the ships here. Strange to say, none of the newspapers have expressed pronounced disapproval at the sending of the ships, and those Cubans who are not relieved by their arrival have apparently accepted it apathetically. The only expressions of apprehension or disapproval which I have heard emanate from the Cuban Government itself, which evidently entertains grave fears that the American Government is deliberately seeking pretext for an intervention.

I believe that Mr. Sanguily entirely understands our motives and intentions in the present crisis—he at least expressed himself most sensibly on the subject—but it is apparent that the President is surrounded by a clique which seeks to create in his mind the most unfounded suspicions as to our motives, apparently with considerable success. This would apparently account for Mr. Rivero's request that the ships be withdrawn. I had an intimation yesterday afternoon that some such step was anticipated when Mr. Patterson, the Subsecretary of State, informed Mr. Gibson that the President was thinking of asking him to telegraph the Department that conditions were so entirely satisfactory that the ships might be immediately withdrawn. The request has not been made.

In compliance with your telegram of June 10, 4 p.m., received last evening, I took occasion to confer at some length with Admiral Osterhaus this morning. He then informed me that he had last evening, after consultation and consideration, telegraphed the Navy Department that he considered it advisable to remain in Habana for the present for moral effect if
nothing else. The admiral expressed himself as agreeing with me that the
same general conditions now exist as at the time when my request for a
battleship was made and he deems it wise to await developments before
deciding that his presence is no longer needed here. As the Department
already knows from my telegram of June 10 (midnight), I am most
decidedly of the same opinion.

As I have previously stated to the Department, it is impossible to tell
whether conditions in Habana will grow better or worse, but the next few
days will probably decide the question. The Government is, I believe,
taking many precautionary measures, and I see by the newspapers that
large numbers of negroes have been arrested on charges of conspiracy
against the Government, and that many others are leaving the city to avoid
arrest. What effect this will have, it is difficult to say.

In summing up, I beg to express my thorough conviction that the
sending of the ships was fully warranted by the situation, that the effect of
their visit has been salutary, and that their withdrawal at this time would
be a serious mistake.

I have, etc.,

A. M. Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,

Habana, June 12, 1912—4 p. m.

Consul at Santiago telegraphs the following:

June 12, 2 p. m. The following order dated June 11, 1912, has been issued by
Monteagudo and I am informed will be promulgated this afternoon:

[Quoted in Spanish; translation.]

"I order the following: Insurgents in arms who will appear before and submit
to the lawful authority before 12 p. m. on the 22d day of the present month will be
exempted from punishment and immediately liberated, except the originators or
leaders of the rebellion and those guilty of a second offense.

"The said originators and leaders will be exempted from the penalty to which
they are liable if they surrender within the time limit set by the foregoing para-
graph, and will suffer that immediately below, from the lowest to the medium
degree. Those guilty of a second offense will, on that account, be held under the
surveillance of the authorities."

From the foregoing it would seem clear that either the Government's
claim of having the rebels surrounded and at its mercy is without founda-
tion in fact or that the President intends to adopt no severe measures
against the rebels in order, for political purposes, to avoid antagonizing
them. One reason given by the afternoon papers for this order is that
the time allowed by the former order did not give sufficient time for the
surrender of some rebels who would have been disposed to lay down their
arms. The Department can judge of the validity of this explanation. It
would seem that in the absence of a disavowal by the President this order
constitutes either an admission of hitherto unacknowledged weakness or an
indication of a vicious sacrifice of principle and public interest—for pur-
poses of political gain.

Beaupré.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 13, 1912—4 p. m.

Government continues to make wholesale arrests of negroes in Habana and vicinity on charges of conspiracy. Judging from judicial proceedings published in press it would seem that jails must be filled. Each day judicial proceedings bring to light events and arrests hitherto unknown. A number of negroes have been arrested on a charge of conspiracy to destroy bridge and other important property in the vicinity of Marianao, dynamite being found in large quantities. Although Government continues to maintain that country is absolutely quiet it is a matter of common knowledge that negroes are conspiring almost openly in various parts of the country without interference from the authorities and that small bands are committing petty depredations throughout the Republic.

A story is being industriously circulated by the Department of the Interior, evidently in accord with Government's general policy of arousing feeling against the United States, to the effect that the President is planning to send General Wood or General Crowder to Cuba to look into the justice of the negroes' demands and that if they so advise the American Government will insist that the negroes be given the upper hand in the Government. This ridiculous story is creating a surprising amount of consternation and resentment even among intelligent classes who would welcome intervention.

Beaupré.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 13, 1912—6 p. m.

Cuban Secretary of State has received telegram from Ferrara, which he has given to the press, saying "ships ordered withdrawn".

Beaupré.

The Secretary of State to the Cuban Minister.

No. 48.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 13, 1912.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note, No. 27, of the 10th instant,* by which, in pursuance of the subject of your remarks to me on the 9th instant, you quote a telegram wherein the Cuban Government makes various statements regarding the present situation in Cuba and wherein, in conclusion, you request that the Government of the United States withdraw the warships now at Habana.

In reply I need only remark that the Government of the United States has every confidence in the reports of its representatives in Cuba,

*Not printed.
whose efficiency in this direction will naturally profit by the candor displayed by the Cuban officials with whom they deal, and that, in view of the information before it, the Government of the United States would not feel justified in changing at this time naval dispositions the true object of which is so well known to the Cuban Government.

Accept, etc.,

P. C. KNOX.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 14, 1912—3 p. m.

In view of your telegram of June 13, 4 p. m., you may give publicity to the following statement:

Under instructions from the Government of the United States, the legation gives notice that no credence should be attached to reports as to the policy or action of the United States except only authentic official statements by the Department of State or by this legation.

On March 13 the President of the United States called special attention to the bad effect of unauthorized promulgation of false rumors. The occasion for now reverting to the subject is due to the story being circulated in Habana and elsewhere to the effect that the President is planning to send a representative to Cuba in connection with questions between the Cuban Government and the insurrectionists.

Although the policy of the United States has, from the very first, been made absolutely clear, so industrious is the circulation of malicious and uninformed rumors that it may be worth while once again to state that only measures of precaution and of ordinary protection of American life and property have been taken; measures irrespective of the special relations of the United States and Cuba and unrelated to the possibility of intervention. These measures do not relieve Cuba of its obligation fully to protect foreign life and property, although they have been recognized as greatly strengthening the hand of the Cuban Government. Indeed, the spirit of these measures has been well called a "preventive policy"—a policy of giving Cuba every opportunity to vindicate its national position.

As was officially stated by the Secretary of State on June 10: "The United States is not contemplating intervention in Cuba, but hopes and believes the Cuban Government will, by prompt and active measures, be able to suppress the insurrection."

KNOX.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 14, 1912—5 p. m.

Department recently received a request for American protection for the Esperanza San Miguel Sugar Mills, owned by the Spanish firm Marimon Bosch Co., Santiago. You may informally and unofficially bring this and similar cases to the attention of the Foreign Office, saying that, while the matter is of course not one primarily for the cognizance of this Government, its friendship for Cuba and its interest in its ultimate welfare prompts it thus to bring the case to the attention of the Cuban Government, with the hope that Cuba will take the measures necessary to obviate the possibility of future embarrassment.

KNOX.
Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Legation,
Habana, June 15, 1912—10 p.m.

The Government censorship of news is now practically complete. Not a word is given out that is not entirely favorable to the Government. The bulletins given out each day announce the killing of large numbers of negroes and only one death on the Government side has been officially admitted so far as I have observed. In accordance with present program it is repeatedly stated in official bulletins and presidential proclamations that the revolution is practically suppressed after victories in which several of the negro leaders, including Estenoz, have been killed and that others have surrendered. The information contained in the following telegram from the consul at Santiago has not been made public by the Government, although it must have been in the possession of the President for some hours; neither have I received any intimation from the Government of the conditions indicated, in spite of the President’s formal promise to keep me fully and frankly informed:

7 p.m. Proclamation cuartel general de la 2a brigada ejercito reivindicator division de combate, dated June 14, 1912, signed by Julio Antomanchi, el general en comision de este brigada, states that in view of the attitude taken by the Government forces attacking and destroying the farms of unfortunate people that have taken no part in the revolution, who have been punished and others macheteados on the public highways not being any independientes de color but liberal and conservative negroes, I, in use of the faculties that correspond to me as brigadier in command of the operations in this zone, will not commit crimes like the Weylerian soldiers toward the forces of the Cuban Government, but be it well understood that all foreigners within the space of 24 hours are required to abandon their homes and those that should not do it within that time will be hung and within the space of 48 hours their consuls will do well to answer me what I ought to do with their properties and interests and if it should pass that time I will comply with the duty of my charge, reducing houses and cafetales to ashes.

Holaday’s comment follows:

As a result territory comprising termino municipal of Cobre depopulated, inhabitants seeking refuge El Cobre and Palma Soriano. Reliable information there are 3,000 refugees El Cobre and equal number at Palma Soriano. Just returned from conference with General Monteagudo, who assures me that he has at this moment 500 guerrillas and soldiers actually operating in that district who will be able to prevent any destruction of property, reestablish order within a short space of time; that the people had abandoned their homes without reason; that he had just issued the following proclamation, which was being distributed [quoted in Spanish; translation follows]: “Upon information that the labor rentistes have made the peaceful citizens who are engaged in working in the fields believe that their lives are in danger if they do no reconcentrate in the city, it is hereby made known to all citizens who are not taking part in the present disturbance of public order that they may freely pursue their usual labor in the field, with the assurance of not being molested and of being protected and receiving from the Government forces such assistance as they may need. The military commander and the chiefs of operating forces shall protect all citizens who are attending to their labors and will render every assistance they may ask for the protection of their lives and property. They will likewise listen to every complaint laid before
them and conduct the appropriate investigation in every case, reporting the result thereof and the decision arrived at to these headquarters. Will make written report to-morrow and will cable you to-morrow evening if any decided change in the situation. Holaday.

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BEAUPRÉ.

Consul Holaday to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
Santiago de Cuba, June 18, 1912——10 a.m.

I do not regard Estenoz letter as of sufficient importance to warrant transmitting the whole of it. After reciting several atrocities, which he alleges have been committed by loyal forces, he makes the following statement:

We believe that it will be impossible to arrive at an agreement with this Government, as it is unworthy of any confidence; since it has done nothing but destroy the confidence of the country, making the white natives believe that we hate them and that our just contention is purely a war of races, the black against the white, the contrary being true, our acts being the best proof, as I have said. We expect, therefore, that as at other times your Government will appoint a representative if it see fit, in order that in the very camp of the revolution he may convince himself of the truth of everything I have said; since if the outrages with regard to our families continue thus we will find ourselves under the necessity of establishing reprisals, a thing that will put an end to civilization and to the wise counsels which we received from you during the time that you governed us.

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HOLADAY.

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé.

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 20, 1912.

Your telegram June 18.*

In a note addressed to you to-day in reply to yours of the 13th instant,* I advised you that I had communicated your note to the Secretary of the Navy with the request that, following the course pursued during the revolutionary disturbances in Cuba in 1906, such protection as may be available for the lives and property of American citizens in Cuba shall likewise be extended to British subjects.

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KNOX.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

AMERICAN LEGATION,
Habana, June 24, 1912——4 p. m.

Consul at Santiago writes as follows:

Outside of partisans of the administration there does not seem to be any great confidence in the constantly reiterated statements at military headquarters here that the rebellion is dominated and that a few scattered bands only remain, which will

*Not printed.
be, entirely extirpated within the next few days. Prevailing public sentiment is unquestionably to the effect that there are just as many, or possibly more, men in rebellion now as there has been at any time since the movement began. True, they are not burning towns and properties as they did at the commencement, as they have been forced to adopt different tactics, and instead of going in large bodies attacking and robbing here and there small defenseless communities they have been compelled to divide up into small groups and seek refuge from the persecution of the loyal troops in the mountain fastnesses, from which places they sally forth now and then, usually at night, and when there are no loyal troops known to be in the vicinity, to commit some depredations and terrify the community, if there happens to be anybody left there to terrify. I am informed by a man whom I believe to be worthy of credence, and whom I also believe to be in a position to obtain reliable information from the rebel forces, that the morale of those in revolt is as good to-day as it was the day they initiated the rebellion; that they are in no wise discouraged; that they are just as determined, that not a single one has surrendered himself and accepted liberty under the terms of the bando of General Monteagudo, except upon specific orders of General Estenoz, because they had presented themselves in the field of operations without arms with which to fight or defend themselves, and for that reason were more of a burden on the operations of the forces than assistance; that these would immediately rejoin the movement as soon as it was possible to obtain arms with which to fight; that there had been a change in the purpose for which the movement was instituted; that they realized that they could not obtain from the Cuban Government the repeal of the Morúa law, which was the main thing for which they had begun the rebellion, and also that our Government would not send a representative for the purpose of acting as mediator between them and the Cuban administration. In view of which the movement from henceforth would be on for the expressed and avowed purpose of bringing about the annexation of the island to the United States, and that the war would be prosecuted unceasingly until intervention took place upon the basis that it would be permanent and have for its ultimate end the annexation of the island to the United States under the full and complete sovereignty thereof.

Beaupré.

Consul Holaday to the Secretary of State.

[Telegram.]

American Consulate,
Santiago, Cuba, June 28, 1912—6 a. m.

Estenoz was killed yesterday about noon in a battle at Micara, between Lamaya and Mayari. His body was brought here on special train, arriving about 3 a. m. to-day and positively identified. Rebel loss stated at military headquarters to have been 150 killed.

Holaday.

The Secretary of State to Minister Beaupré.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, June 29, 1912—5 p. m.

Pursuant to the following telegram received by the Navy Department from Admiral Osterhaus, the large war vessels at Key West, Habana, and Guantanamo have been ordered north, the gunboats, auxiliaries, and marines to remain: "In my opinion, which the minister concurs in, there is no necessity for ships here, and that the Third Division, Atlantic Fleet,
with force on board, may return north; also, in my opinion, state of affairs in the Province of Oriente is such that all vessels of the Fourth Division, Atlantic Fleet, may be withdrawn, leaving landed force and gunboats to handle situation. The latest reliable information indicates Cuban forces can control situation.” Inform consul at Santiago.

KNOX.

Minister Beaupré to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 323.]

American Legation,
Habana, July 2, 1912.

Sir: While there have been no radical developments since Estenoz was killed, I think I may safely say that the situation has improved to a marked degree, and that a very encouraging change is manifest in public confidence. It is, of course, impossible to predict with certainty what may happen so long as Ixonet and other leaders contrive to elude capture, but it is now generally believed that the Government has the upper hand and will, with a proper display of energy, be able completely to crush the revolt. I have, etc.,

A. M. Beaupré.